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I. PURPOSES OF THE PROJECT
In recent years, Iowa farmers have faced large variations in grain prices
in short periods of time. Price variability stems from increased dependence on
foreign markets and a wide range of world developments that affect cash grain
prices. As an example of the potential impact on farmers, the variability
• ' t ' ^
in 1980-crop prices during the last half of 1979 created a potential variation
of $20,000 in net income from a 300 acre Central Iowa cash grain farm — depend
ing on whether crops were sold at the high or low end of the range of available
prices
Price variability such as this creates an important role for forward
sales of corn and soybeans through elevator contracts or futures markets as a
means of reducing risk. But to use these marketing tools effectively, infor
mation on-the usual relationship between local cash.prices and futures prices is
essential. This information is.necessary to determine whether local elevator
contracts are offering attractive prices or whether direct use of futures
contracts represents a more profitable alternative. A major thrust of this
project was to develop such information for the six Iowa grain price reporting
districts. ...
Other objectives of the.research included (1) determining whether economic
incentives for.delivery on grain futures contracts from Iowa have occurred
in recent years, (2) determining whether delivery costs set a lower limit on
the differential between local cash prices and expiring grain futures contracts,
(3) an analysis of the potential for reducing variability of grain prices and
increasing average prices received by farmers through hedging in futures contracts
-2-
and (4) a comparison of pricing opportunities on the MidAmerica Commodity
Ex-change and the Chicago Board of Trade. The MidAmerica Commodity Exchange
(MAE) is a long-established futures market in Chicago with corn and soybean
futures contracts nearly identical to those on the Chicago Board of Trade
(CBOT) — except for size. MidAmerica contracts are traded in 1,000 bushel
units, in contrast to the larger 5,000 bushel contracts on the CBOT. The
smaller contracts enable small and medium-size farmers to spread out marketings
more than would be possible with the CBOT contract. In addition, the smaller
contracts offer advantages to farm operators wishing to gain experience in
futures trading while limiting the size of their total position.
An additional objective of the project was to examine the basis (cash-
futures price relationships) in Chicago grain markets during the final trading
days on expiring contracts for evidence of delivery problems. Such problems,
if they do occur occasionally, could adversely affect the grain basis in Iowa
and other locations.
II. SOURCES OF DATA
This study involved analysis of a large volume of data on local grain
prices, CBOT and MAE futures prices, freight rates and other expenses of
marketing grain. The data were obtained through the cooperation of market
news reporters at the Iowa Department of Agriculture, the market news office
at Iowa State University, officials from the CBOT, MAE, Chicago office of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission and several grain companies. The authors
are appreciative of cooperation obtained from these various firms and agencies.
In 1974 the Iowa Department of Agriculture began reporting cash grain
prices at local elevators in six price reporting districts across the state.
Prior to that time, mid-month state average prices were the only officially
1-3-
reported grain prices in Iowa. Since a Tnajor objective of this resarch was to
analyze local pricing opportunities and variations in these opportxinities
across the state, the regional price reports were utilized here. These reports
are collected and released daily to local radio stations and newspapers. Thus,
they are available continuously to Iowa farmers.
This analysis focused on the years 1974 through 1979, since data were not
available for earlier time periods. Even if pre-1974 data had been available,
rapid changes in price relationships in the last few years would have made
such information of limited value for the purposes of this report. To reduce
the data to a manageable volume, Thursday cash and futures prices were used
for most of the analysis presented here. In case the markets were closed on
Thursday for a holiday or other reasons, prices on the next earliest trading
day were used. Since relationships between local cash and futures prices
normally do not show large changes in short periods of time, Thursday prices
were believed to meet most objectives of this study. However, one exception
where more frequent price observations were used was in the analysis of cash-
futures price relationships at Chicago during the last several weeks of trading
on expiring contracts.
Figure 1 shows the boundaries for Iowa price-reporting districts. In
the two eastern districts, grain prices are closely related to river markets.
In these areas, country elevators typically buy grain from farmers and truck
it to river terminals or local processors for immediate cash sales. Cash
grain prices at these locations thus are heavily influenced by river navigation
conditions, barge freight rates (which are unregulated and fluctuate with
demand conditions) and barge grain bids at gulf export elevators. The four
remaining districts normally are dominated by rail shipping patterns, with
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locai corn and soybean prices being'-influenced by availability of rail shipping
equipment, regulated freight rates and rail"bids for grain at gulf ports.
Data on grain prices' and the grain b'asis in-the vicinity of Des Moines have
been available for several years, —^ In addition, basis information for parts
of Illinois, Southern^Minnesota, Kentucky-and South Dakota has been compiled
and published.' - Howeverthis-report represents the first time.basis, data
and an analysis of grain hedging 'opportunities have been made available for, all
i (
six districts of Iov7a.
HI. 'THE _BASIS AND ITS RELATIONSHIPS TO COSTS OF DELIVERING ON FUTURES CONTRACTS
When cash—grain producers or elevator managers use futures markets, ^or-
hedging, their purpose is to "lock in" a favorable or profitable price for their
product and protect against the risk of lower prices. This is done by selling
futures contracts, then later selling the grain and buying back futures co;i-
tracts to close out the futures position, — Technically, a risk in the cash
market is offset by an opposite and approximately equal risk in the futures
market. If cash and futures prices follow each other, a decline in cash prices
will be offset by an approximately equal gain in futures prices and the hedger
will obtain price protection. However, if cash and futures prices do not move
in a parallel manner or in a predictable relationship to each other, full price
protection may not be obtained.
1/ This information is available in"R. Wisher, Basis Patterns for>Xorn
and Soybeans in Central Iowa, M-1077 (Rev.), Department of Economics,
Iowa State University(Ames, Iowa),•
2/ T. A. Hieronymus, Hedging for Country Elevators, AERR 91, Department of
Agricultural Economics, University^of Illinois (Urbana,- Illinois),'
March 1968; R. Dahl and P. Henneberry, Cash-Futures Price l^latiohships.
Guides to Grain Marketing, Station Bulletin 517-1977, University of
Minnesota (St. Paul, Minnesota) 1977; Arthur B.' Sbgn. Farmer Use .of
Grain Futures,(Bulletin 590), South Dakota State University (Brookings,
South Dakota!) November 1971"; and S. A. Callahan, Grain Merchandising
and Futures Markets in Kentucky, Agricultural Economics Extension Information
Series No. 7, University of Kentucky (Lexington, Kentucky) March 1972.
Principles of hedging' are discussed in R. Wisner, Using Grain Futures
in the Farm Business, PM687 (Rev.)., Iowa State University (Ames, Iowa)
May i980. -
-6-
For this reason, the threat of delivery is important in futures markets.
The threat of delivery is the mechanism that keeps cash and futures prices in
line with each other and causes them to move in a predictable manner. If cash
prices differ from futures by more than the costs of delivery, farmers, eleva
tor managers and others have an incentive to buy cash grain, sell futures
and deliver on futures contracts. Theoretically, this process should occur
4/
until an economic incentive for delivery no longer exists, — In a properly
functioning futures market, the threat of delivery should eliminate the need
for large actual deliveries and should permit most traders to close out their
initial transaction through an offsetting futures sale or purchase rather
than by delivery.
To test whether the delivery mechanism has been effective, a "delivery
cost basis" was computed for each of the six price reporting districts of Iowa.
The "delivery cost basis" as defined here is the cost of delivering grain on
Chicago futures contracts from each local district of Iowa. A later section
of this report examines whether the difference between actual cash and futures
prices in Iowa has exceeded delivery costs.
Basis and Its Use in Hedging
The terra, basis, refers to the difference between local cash prices and
prices for a specific futures contract month. For example, with a North Central
Iowa cash price of $2.30 per bushel and a July futures price of $2.80 per
bushel, the local basis would be $.50 under July. The basis is expressed as
cents over or under the futures contract pricej the Iowa basis typically is
under futures, while the gulf export basis normally would be over Chicago futures,
47 The importance of the threat of delivery is discussed in R. Wisner and
~ J. M. Skadberg "Commodity Futures Markets — are Changes Needed?" paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Agricultural Economics
Association, (Texas A&M University), College Station, Texas, August 1974.
4. -
-7-
Basis is a key input for farmers in evaluating hedging opportunities. To
localize grain futures prices and determine what price the market is offering
in his local area, a farmer would need to know what his basis is likely
.to be a month before the futures contract expires,* That's the time he would
normally plan to lift his' hedge and sell his grain at the local elevator, if
he were utilizing the futures market.
Here's an example of how the futures market would be localized. Let's-
say May corn futures contracts are trading at $3.30 per bushel. An analysis
of' local basis patterns for the previous three years — with adjustments for
increases diie to inflation indicates the local basis should be about $.55
under May during the month of AprjLl. lii this case, the producer would dediict
55 cents from the May futures, alon^ with the brokerage fee and estimated
interest costs on margin money deposited with the broker. Under these conditions the
futures market would be "offering
cash grain producers about $2,71 Localizing Example
per bushel for their com, provided * May futures price ' $3.30
they sell it on May futures cpn-' Less:
' Basis .55
tracts, store it until April, then-buy " Brokerage fee .01
. Interest on
back the futures and sell the corn margin • »03 • •
locally at that time. ' Total • ' - ' '".'Sg
Localized futures price $2.71
Delivery Cost Basis " ' ' , - • •
Theoretically (for reasons noted earlier) the"costs "of delivering grain
to Chicago should set a lower limit on the Iowa grain basis under nearby
futures contracts as their maturity or delivery date is approached. To '
determine whether delivery coists actually set a lower limit on the basisi '
these costs were compiled for each of the six price'reporting districts.
-8-
Delivery costs were calculated from three centrally located cities in each
district, thus giving delivery costs from 18 locations in Iowa. In most cases,
delivery costs varied only slightly within price reporting districts. For
analytical purposes, average delivery costs for the three locations In each
district were used. Figure 2 shows the specific locations from which delivery
costs were calculated.
In the case of com, three alternative delivery locations are available for
sellers who decide to deliver on their futures contracts. Delivery may be made
at approved warehouses (elevators) in Chicago, Toledo, Ohio or the St. Louis-
East-St. Louis-Alton, Illinois area. Delivery points in the St. Louis and
Toledo, Ohio areas were added after evidences of serious delivery problems
developed in the early 1970's, ~ These alternative delivery points became
effective starting with the Decembeir 1976 contracts. If com is delivered to
the Toledo or St:. Louis areas, the futures contract price is discounted by
four cents per bushel to reflect "non-par" delivery locations.
Since Toledo, Ohio is much further from Iowa than either Chicago or
St. Louis, delivery costs to Toledo were not considered in this analysis. If
an incentive for delivery should occur, Iowa grain logically would be delivered
at Chicago or St. Louis rather than the more distant location.
Chicago was the only available delivery point for CBOT and MAE soybean
futures contracts during most of the period studied here. Toledo, Ohio has
recently been added as an alternative soybean delivery point, but not in time
to incorporate into this analysis. ~
37 These problems are discussed in Ibid.
6/ Toledo, Ohio became effective as an alternative delivery point strating with
the September 1979 futures contract. Soybeans delivered at Toledo are
discounted 8 cents per bushel; the discount and substantial distance
involved would discourage delivery of Iowa soybeans to Toledo except
under very unusualy conditions.
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Coats Involved In Delivery
If a hedger or other futures trader should decide to deliver on futures
contracts, he would incur transportation, inspection, grading, storage, interest
and insurance coses. In addition to these expenses, prices at the farm level
would also reflect the deduction of a merchandising margin to cover operating
costs at the country elevator. Costs for delivering from various Iowa districts
to Chicago in mid-1974 and mid-1979 are shown in Tables 1 and 2.
Several alternative rail rates are available for shipment of grain into
Chicago including single and multiple-car export rates and domestic rates.
To meet the requirements for futures contract delivery, rail grain must be
shipped by domestic rates which provide transit billing. These rates typically
are higher than export rates but allow processing, inspection and grading or
other operations to be performed at intermediate locations, with the grain
or processed product to be shipped on to a final domestic destination beyond
Chicago. If grain is delivered in fulfillment of futures contracts by truck or
with other rail shipping rates, an extra charge Is added to provide the equiva
lent of transit billing to the individual or firm which received delivery. ^
Because of these considerations, the rail rates shown in Tables 1 and 2 are
single-car domestic rates which meet requirements for delivery on futures con
tracts.
It is the seller's decision of whether or not to deliver on grain
U Based on Rules and Regulations of the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago,
Chapter 33, and personal communication with officials from the Chicago Board
of Trade and the Chicago office of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission*
This extra charge to provide transit billing is the difference between the
flat rate and the proportional rate on domestic shipments from Chicago to
New York City; these charges amounted to 18c per bushel on com and 19c
per bushel on soybeans in raid-1979according to officials of the Chicago
Board of Trade.
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futures "contracts. If a decision is made to' deliver/ the seller is obligated
to find warehouse space in one of the five elevators approved for delivery in
Chicago or similar elevators at the alternate delivery points. •Since.these
elevators are not obligated to accept delivery, the seper has no-assurance
that space will be available for tiis grain. - However, the existence of multiple
delivery points increases the chances thafspace will be available for futures
delivery at all times. To complete the delivery process, the seller must have.
warehouse receipt^' issued for his'grain at an approved delivery elevator.
i
Issuance of such receipts typically involves charges for weighing, official
grading, inspection and elevation of grain at the delivery elevator, as well
as a small charge for storage and insurance' until title to the grain is passed
to the person or firm who bought the futures contract. As much as ten days to
9 two weeks can be required for shipinenf of the grain and completion of the payment.
process, so'the seller faces'an,interest cost on the grain inventory, either as
an opportmity cost or as .an actual cash outlay if funds are borrowed.
Three conclusions are immeiiiately obvious from Tables 1 and 2: (1) delivery
costs have increased substantially in the five-year period studied here,
(2) delivery costs are lowest in southeastern Iowa and highest in the northwest
.pripe reporting district and (3) the cost differential-between-the southeast and
northwest districts has widened significantly during the past five years. The
delivery cost basis has increased 60 to 72 percent during the past five years,
with tHe exact increase varying by districts, depending on the initial freight
rates. Rail freight rates were raised 12 times during the period from early
• • 8/ •
"1974 through mid-1979 — an average of 2.2 increases per year. " Increased freight
costs reflect rapidly rising fuel expenses as well as inflation in all mother
railroad operating costs. Inflation and rising interest rates are major factors
behind the increases in other costs associated-with delivery.
8/ Six additional increases occurred from mid-1979 through late
May 1980.
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Table 1 indicates the delivery cost basis for corn in mid-1979 was about
64 cents per bushel in northwest Iowa. In other words* these costs suggest an
incentive for delivery would have existed in raid-1979 if northwest Iowa cash
corn prices paid to farmers were more than 64 cents per bushel below expiring
futures contracts. The basis could be expected to exceed this level prior to
the futures delivery month, due to storage and interest costs of holding grain
until futures contract maturity. But in the delivery month, if transportation
is readily available, one would expect the delivery costs to set a lower limit
on the basis. However, if transportation is not available because of rail
equipment shortages, a labor strike or similar problems, the delivery mechanism
would not necessarily be effective in setting a lower limit.
The delivery cost basis for soybeans in northwest Iowa in raid-1979 was
approximately 75 cents per bushel. In the opposite corner of the state,
delivery costs ranged from 47 cents per bushel for corn to 60 cents for soybeans.
To determine whether deliveries of Iowa grain would be made to St. louis
rather than Chicago, freight rates to this area also were analyzed. Railroads
serving Iowa reported freight rates to this destination are slightly above
shipments to Chicago. The higher freight costs apparently reflect a less
advantageous situation on backhauls or shipments of other products into the
western cornbelt on the return trip. These higher costs and the 4 cent price
discount at St. Louis clearly would make rail delivery from Iowa to St. Louis
infeasible except under unusual situations such as a strike by Chicago grain
handlers.
A similar analysis was made of truck delivery costs to St. Louis. Several
Iowa trucking firms were contacted for truck rates on grain shipments to St. Louis
The firms indicated St. Louis is not considered a desirable destination for truck
shipments because of very limited backhaul possibilities. Quoted truck rates
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from Iowa to St. Louis were near rail freight rates into Chicago. However, when
the extra cost for transit billing and the 4c discount for delivery at a non-par
location were included, Chicago became the lowest-cost delivery point even from
the southeastern price reporting district of Iowa.
One other potential method of delivery on com and soybean futures contracts
is by truck shipment from Iowa to Chicago. To analyze this possibility, truck
rates for grain shipments from various locations were obtained from trucking firms,
In most cases, officials of such firms indicated the rates given were typical
for Chicago shipments, but that actual rates could vary slightly — depending
on backhaul possibilities and the demand for truck shipments to other locations.
Truck rates for corn shipments from Iowa,to Chicago were equal to or slightly
»• below domestic rail rates in mid-1979. However, in all cases the increased cost
to provide transit billing exceeded the potiential savings in freight rates,
T • ' ' ; ' • ' •
noted earlier, the seller must provide transit billing or its equivalent
value when delivering on corn and soybpan futures contracts. Because of these
billing procedures, rail shipments fropi Iowa would be the usual method of
delivering on com futures contracts. In the case of soybeans, a similar con
clusion was reached. In all districts, rail shipments of soybeans was found
to be the lowest cost method of: delivering on futures contracts.
IV. BASIS PATTERNS BY IOWA PRICE ^REPORTING DISTRICTS
After computing delivery costs, the next step In the research reported
here was to compile basis data by price reporting districts for the years 1974
through 1979, The Thursday basjLs was computed for each futures contract delivery
-16-
month for the marketing years running from October through September. The basis
under nearby futures contracts during the contract expiration month was then
compared with delivery coats to determine If incentives for delivery from Iowa
have occurred.
Com Basis Patterns
Figures 3 through 8 show the 1977 through 1979 com basis under July futures
contracts by price reporting district and the delivery cost basis for the same
years. Corn basis data for other futures contracts for 1978-79 are shown in
Appendix Tables 1 through 6.— The Iowa com basis under July futures trad-
tionally has been wide at harvest, narrowing into early winter, widening again
in late winter or early spring then narrowing further into April or May, A
widening basis means cash prices are declining relative to futures, while the
opposite situation would be indicated by a narrowing basis. The 1977-79 period
followed this general pattern, as did earlier years in the study. These seasonal
variations in basis can be explained largely by storage costs, reoccurring vari
ations in farmer marketings, availability of storage space and transportation.
At harvest time, cash prices usually are discounted from July futures prices by
the cost of storing grain until the futures contract matures, as well as a loca
tion differential from Chicago, In addition, local shortages of storage space
and/or transportation can depress the basis further. These factors encourage
country elevators to widen merchandising margins to cover risks of quality
deterioration when grain is piled outside and risks of late penalities and other
added costs if the grain cannot be shipped on schedule.
In the first several weeks after harvest, farmer marketings typically decline,
thus alleviating the lack of storage space and allowing cash prices to work higher
relative to futures quotations. Late winter or early spring often is a time of
accelerated farmer marketings as producers sell grain to obtain cash for major
spring expenses. This often weakens or widens the basis in late February or early
Basis data for the years 1974 through 1978 are presented by price reporting
districts in Basis Patterns For Corn and Soybeans, Iowa State University
Publications M-1210 through M-1215 (Ames, Iowa) May 1980.
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March. Then, during the spring fieldwork season a decline in farmer marketings
and open navigation on the Great Lakes and upper Mississippi river often cause
cash prices to strengthen relative to futures. The usual result is a narrowing
grain basis in Iowa during April and early May.
In the years shown in Figures 3 through 8, the basis narrowed several cents
per bushel in the first few weeks after harvesting was completed. The actual
level of basis at harvest varied from year to year with local supply conditions,
storage costs and availability of transportation. For example, the October-
December 1979 basis was sharply below the previous two years in all six price
reporting districts. Lack of storage space, a railroad strike and high interest
rates which increased the cost of storage were important factors depressing the
late 1979 basis. Additional pressure probably resulted from a dock workers*
strike at Duluth, Minnesota and Superior, Wisconsin during the summer and early
fall which forced a greater than normal amount of Minnesota^ grain into the,same
transportation channels that normally handle Iowa grain. By late April 1980»
the basis under July futures "had narrowed as much as 45 cents per bushel from
harvest lows. In north central Iowa, this brought the late April corn basis
to within.about 8 cents of a year earlier.' The 8-cent differential would reflect
inflation in marketing and transportation costs during the previous year,
I _
Adjusted Normal Corn Basis by District
An important requirement of farmers in evaluating marketing alternatives is
the "nonnal"or likely basis for the price'reporting district in which they market
their grain. This is the basis .that would be appropriate for adjusting futures
contracts to determine local hedging opportunities.' As a guide in determining
the normal com basis, Table 3 shows the basis by district under December, May
and July com futures contracts during the month prior to contract expira,tion
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for the years 1977, 1978 and 1979. These three contracts are probably the
ones most commonly used by farmers in hedging grain sales.
• - . ^ I
In the 1960's and early 1970*s, Iowa basis patterns were remarkably stable
and a "normal" basis could easily be determined for most areas of the state.
But with rapid inflation in recent years and serious transportation problems,
the "normal" or likely basis cannot be determined as precisely. To determine
the appropriate basis for use in hedging grain, farmers and elevator operators
need to look at the most recent yearns basis and adjust for inflation that has
occurred in the last few years. In making this adjustment, any unusual local
supply, demand and transportation factors also need to be considered.
For example, the data in Table 3 show an average annual increase in the
basis under July futures during the month of June ranging from 4 cents per
bushel per year in southwest Iowa to 13 cents per bushel per year in the
northwest district. Further examination of the July ba:sis data indicates the
northwest district had a-substantially smaller basis than normal in 1977; in
June 1977, its July basis was the second smallest of any district in Iowa.
Normally, northwest Iowa would be expected to have the widest (or largest)
basis of any district in the state because of its greater distance from port
locations. The narrow basis during the spring and summer of 1977 can be ex
plained largely by a serious drought the previous year that lowered the northwest
^ 10/ •
Iowa average corn yield to 73.1 bushels per acre. With reduced yields, sub-
.terminal elevators found it necessary to bid more aggressively to attract
• r. t
Krain from surrounding counties to fully utilize leased transportation equipment.
Taking these local supply conditions into account and examining basis trends
for other districts, a.more normal rate of basis inflation in the July com
basis appears to have been about 7 to 9 cents per bushel per year in the past
S/ 'Based on Iowa Crop-and Livestock Reporting .Service,-.a978 -Iowa Agricultural
Statistics, (Des Moines, Iowa) October 1978, p. 18.
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two yeaTs. In some cases, the April basis under May futures increased at a
sliglaiy less rapid rate.
As noted earlier, the 1979 harvest-time basis probably increased (or
widened) slightly more than can be accounted for by direct freight and marketing
cost increases alone. Rail and dock workers strikes, along with record local
supplies and lack of storage space were important depressing influences on the
the basis at that time.
The basis data in Table 3 were computed using the mid-point of reported
Thursday cash prices for each district and closing futures prices for the same
day. However, users of this information should note that in most cases daily
prices for each district are reported in a 10 to 16 cent per bushel range, ^us,
cash prices in some parts of each district may typically be as much as 5 to 8
cents above or below the district average. To use this information effectively,
farmers should note how their local prices differ from the average for their
district; this difference can then be added to or deducted from the basis records
shown here to obtain a more exact basis for their local area.
Soybean Basis Patterns
Appendix Figures 1-6 show the Iowa soybean basis under July futures by
price reporting district for the years 1977 through 1979, along with the
corresponding delivery cost basis. The soybean basis shows the same general
patterns as corn: it tends to weaken at harvest, narrows into early winter,
widens in late winter, then narrows again In late spring and early suramer.
The same factors that Influence the corn basis are behind these seasonal ten
dencies. However, the soybean basis has been much more variable and subject
to more rapid short-term changes than corn. As Appendix Figure 2 indicates, the North
central Iowa soybean basis under July narrowed by nearly 30 cents per bushel
from late March to mid-April 1978 as farmers began spring fleldwork and winter
transportation problems eased. In late December 1978, it widened by 17 cents
-27-
per bushel as the Great Lakes and upper Mississippi closed for the'winter and
year-end farmer selling of beans for tax purposes accelerated. From mid-
January to early March 1979, the basis under July futures widened by 25 cents
per bushel as a result of severe midwest transportation problems combined with
plentiful soybean supplies in mid-South producing areas. In both 1978 and
1979, however, the early summer basis was considerably narrower than at harvest-
time. Similar basis patterns for other districts are shown in Appendix Figures
1 and 3 through 6.
As with corn, the 1979 harvest-time soybean basis in all districts widened
substantially more than in previous•years. The soybean basis at that time was
influenced by the same factors as-corn including labor problems, high interest -
costs, lack of storage space, rising freight costs and increases in other
expenses of marketing grain.
Soybean basis data for other futures contracts and for the 1978-79 mar
keting year are shown in Appendix Tables 7 through 12. These data aiso are
based on the mid—point of Thursday cash prices and closing futures prices for
the same dayi^^
Adjusted Normal Soybean Basis
Table 4 shows the recent soybean basis under November, May and July soy
bean futures by Iowa price reporting districts one month before futures con
tract expiration. These basis patterns are similar to those shown earlier for
corn, except that the soybean basis under November and July,futures during the
last two years increased nearly twice as rapidly as the corresponding com
basis. Adjusting for the drought in Northwest Iowa in 1976 and its impact on
local basis patterns, the November and July soybean basis one month before
a-ontract maturity increased at a 13 to 15 cent per bushel per year rate during
-• through 1978 are presented-by pricereporting districts in Basis Patterns For Corn and Soybeans. Iowa State
University Publications M-1210 through M-1215 (Ames, Iowa) May 1980
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the 1977-79 period. As an average for the three years, rising freight rates to
Chicago were equivalent to about one-third the increase in the November and July
soybean basis. Table 4 also indicates the May basis increased much less rapid
ly in 1977-79 than the basis under other contracts. This was probably due to
an unusually wide basis under May futures during April 1977. The soybean market
in April and May 1977 was influenced by several unusual developments which may
have adversely affected the basis at that time including (1) heavy speculation
in soybean futures by a wealthy family and resulting CFTC action, and (2)
large losses in soybean trading by a major grain exporting firm.
Unless inflation accelerates from early 1979 rates, it is questionable
whether the soybean basis can continue to increase at the same percentage rate
as in the past two years. Increases at this rate would soon widen the local
soybean basis beyond the delivery cost basis, thus encouraging delivery to
prevent rapid further deterioration in the soybean basis.
Gulf Basis and Its Impact on Iowa Basis
\Vhile delivery costs should set a lower limit on the Iowa grain basis, the
actual basis may be considerably smaller (narrower) than would be indicated by
delivery costs into Chipago. The reason for this is that Iowa grain markets
most of the time are Gulf export oriented. Much of Iowa's excess grain production
(beyond local feed and processing needs) is shipped by rail or barge to export
elevators located at the Gulf of Mexico. The local price for Iowa's com and
soybean crops is generally based on Gulf export bids less freight and other
marketing costs. Gulf grain prices normally are above Chicago futures prices
because ocean freight rates from the Gulf to major foreign markets usually are
lower than those from Chicago and other Great Lakes ports. Ocean freight rates
are influenced by a number of variables including size of vessel, length of
time required for the trip and the backhaul situation.
-30-
Table 5 shows the Gulf corn and soybean basis from mid-1976 through mid-1979
along with freight costs from Iowa to the Gulf, assumed merchandising margins
and an indicated basis to Iowa farmers in East Central and North Central Iowa.
Two things should be noted in evaluating the information in Table 5. First,
barge freight rates are unregulated and fluctuate with the supply and demand for
transportation. When demand is strong, the rates rise to ration existing capacity
and to encourage new investment in the barge industry. When demand is slack,
the rates fall as a means of slowing the expansion in barge capacity. With
fluctuating rates, a substantial amount of barge shipping normally is contracted
In advance, sometljnes at rates below spot or current rates such as those
shown In Table 5. In contrast, rail rates are closely regulated by a govern-^ .
ment agency. It should also be noted that rail rates depend on the size of
units being shipped. Elates in Table 5 are based on shipments In 50-car units;
rates for single-car, 25-car and other smaller units would be higher. Rates
for 75-car or larger shipments would be lower than shown in Table 5.
The Gulf corn basis ranged from 6 to 14 cents over nearby futures prices
from mid-1976 through mld-1979. This relatively small increase in Gulf bids
suggests much of the increased coat of marketing grain in recent years has been
passed back to farmers rather than forward to foreign buyers. After adjusting
for freight costs and merchandising margins, the Indicated equivalent North
Central Iowa corn basis ranged from 30 to 42 under nearby futures — along with
an equivalent East Central Iowa corn basis 19 to 38 under. The actual basis
in either area will vary with local conditions, size and method of shipments from
country elevators, trucking costs from local East Central Iowa elevators to
river terminals and other factors. However, the equivalent Iowa basis shown
here is substantially smaller than the delivery cost basis and Illustrates why
local cash prices may run closer to Chicago futures than delivery costs would
suggest.
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Similar conclusions are illustrated for soybeans in Table 5. However,
both the Gulf soybean basis and the equivalent North Central and East Central
Iowa soybean basis have been more variable than corn. At mid-year during the
past four years, the Gulf soybean basis has varied from 6 under nearby futures
to 25 over. Instability in the Gulf basis and freight rate changes have been
important causes of variations in the local Iowa soybean basis.
Comparlson of Actual District Basis Patterns and Delivery Cost Basis
This section coT!^)ares the actual Iowa com and soybean basis patterns
by district from 1974 through 1979 with the delivery cost basis as presented
previously. The two sets of information were compared to determine whether
incentives for delivery of Iowa grain on futures contracts have occurred at
times during recent years. In making this comparison, the basis under nearby
futures during the contract expiration month was used as the focus for analysis.
At other times, delivery costs would not necessarily be expected to set a lower
limit on the actual basis.
Corn - Table 6 shows comparisons of the actual basis and delivery cost basis
for com. Hie actual corn basis was calculated using the average Thursday basis
for each district for the first three weeks of the month in which the futures
contracts expire. TTiis is the time period in which decisions about delivery
would be made, and any incentive for delivery — if it should develop — would
occur at this time. As noted previously, incentives for delivery would exist
if the actual basis is larger (wider) than the delivery cost basis.
The data in Table 6 indicate that in nearly all cases during the period studied
here, the average com basis in Iowa during the month of futures contract expira
tion was narrower (smaller) than the delivery cost basis. Even after taking
into account reported cash com prices which typically range 5 to 8 cents above
and below the district average, the basis on the low end of reported prices
generally was smaller than the delivery cost basis. However, three exceptions
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were Che South Central District in December 197A; and the Northeast District in
July and December 1979 when the average basis was slightly larger than the
delivery cost basis. The latter periods were times of serious transportation
pr<ibluiii.s .'iiid probcihJy contributed to the wide basis. In each of those cases,
trucking to a higher bidding elevator in the local district would have been a
more profitable alternative than delivering on futures contracts. The normal
daily range in cash grain prices in each district largely reflects differing
freight rates at local elevators and differing availability of transportation
equipment. Freight rate variations from one elevator to another can easily account
for variations of 6 to 10 cents per bushel in local com prices.
The results from this phase of the study can be summarized as follows:
market conditions have consistently prqvid^d a narrower Iowa com basis in
recent years than would be expected from looking at delivery costs alone. As
a result, no incentive was found for.d^liv^ry of corn by Iowa producers or grain
elevators to fulfill futures contracts during the study period.
• Soybeans - Comparisons of the delivery cost basis and actual Iowa soybean
basis under expiring futures contracts are shown in Table 7 for the years
t
1974 through 1979. These data were computed in the same way as the information
on com presented in the preceding section. In contrast to corn, the soybean
basis under expiring futures in all districts at times exceeded the delivery
. cost basis. This indicates the threat of delivery does not always set a lower
limit on the local soybean basis.
The three contracts in which the actual basis exceeded deliviefy costs were
May, August and November futures. In 197A, the average basis under the expiring
August futures contract during the month of August exceeded the delivery cost
in all six districts — by" 1 to 7 cents per bushel. At that time,, the soybean
market was being influenced by unusually late development of the crop^ hot
and dry weather the preceding month, and a major distortion in the Chicago soybean
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basis the previous summer when the July futures contract expired. Export move
ment of U.S. grains was good but not outstanding in late July and early August
1974, and should not have caused oiajor congestion in Chicago delivery facilities.
However, developments of the previous year probably made the Iowa grain trade
reluctant to attempt to deliver on soybean futures contracts for a relatively
small potential gain.
In 1978 as the May futures contract expired, the soybean basis under
nearby futures in three districts again exceeded the delivery cost basis —
by 2 to 6 cents per bushel. This situation occurred in the northwest, northeast
and southwest districts. In 1978, transportation problems and a shortage of
rail cars for moving grain may have contributed to the unusually wide basis
under the expiring May soybean contract. However, if transportation problems
I
were the main cause of the wide basis, a similar situation would have been
expected In the expiring May com basis. But this was not the case; the
average Iowa com basis In all six districts was substantially smaller than
the delivery cost basis. In fact, in nearly all cases even the basis at the
low end of the range of reported com prices was smaller than the delivery cost
basis. The much smaller com basis suggests that factors other than transpor
tation were contributing to a depressed soybean basis in May 1978.
Analysis of the basis under the expiring November 1974 futures contract al
so revealed an Incentive for delivery on soybean futures contracts from the two
eastern Iowa districts and southwest Iowa at that time. The basis in November
1974 probably was Influenced by the same conditions as in the preceding August.
Aside from these instances, the soybean basis in all districts as futures
contracts approached expiration was substantially narrower than the delivery
cost basis.
-39-
It van be concluded from this.analysis that delivery costs do. not always
set a lower iiniit on -the Iowa soybean basis as futures contracts approach
maturity. Basis behavior on the expiring May, August and,November contracts
indicates some impediments to delivery on soybean futures contracts may have
occurred in recent years. Such impedinients would tend to slightly lower hedging
income available to Iowa cash grain producers and country elevator operators
from returns that would be expected if the threat of delivery is fully operational
at all times. , j. •-
'V. CHICAGO BASIS FOR CORN AND SOYBEANS
AS FUTURES CONTRACTS'APPROACH-MATURITY'
Th'e preceding sections suggest that delivery costs and the threat of delivery
have been effective in setting a lower limit on'the Iowa corn basis. However,
Iowa soybean basis patterns raise questions about- the effectiveness of the de
livery mechanism in the soybean futures market. To provide additional insights
into the delivery process,-the Chicago basis under expiring com and soybean
futures contracts was compiled and compared with costs of delivering on futures
contracts at Chicago.
Conditions Expected If No Impediments to Delivery Exist
.As a framework for analysis of the Chicago basis, it was believed that
three conditions would be evident if no major impediments to delivery are
present. These conditions are as follows:
,1. During the final month of trading befpre a particular futures contract
expires, Chicago cash prices should differ from the price of the
expiring futures contract for the same commodity by no more than
the costs of delivery, except possibly for brief periods.
-AO-
2. Cash prices during the final trading month should be expected to
range above and below expiring futures contract prices with about
equal frequency.
3. Variability of the Oilcago basis against expiring futures contracts
should gradually diminish during the final weeks of trading as the
futures contract expiration date is reached.
With an effective threat of delivery, the knowledge that some traders stand ready
times to make or receive delivery would be expected to hold the basis
within the range Indicated by delivery costs. Short hedgers (those selling
futures contracts) would stand ready to make delivery if the basis is under
expiring futures by more than the costs of delivery. Long hedgers (those buying
futures), on the other hand, would stand ready to hold their contracts for de
livery if the basis is over expiring futures by more than the delivery costs.
If neither side has an undue advantage in the market and no impediments to
delivery exist, one might expect deviations of cash prices above and below
expiring futures quotations to occur with about equal frequency. Deviations
might be slightly larger four to six weeks prior to contract expiration than
at contract maturity — because of the interest and storage costs involved in
holding grain inventories until the time of delivery. Or in the case of the
long hedger, these costs would be involved in acquiring cash grain to maintain
exporting or processing operations until delivery will be received on futures
contracts.
In this analysis, Chicago cash corn and soybean prices were obtained from
Reuter News Service as compiled and reported by the Grain Market News Branch,
Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. As in all
basis computations in this study, futures prices were obtained from
the Iowa State University Market News Office files and were originally received
-41-
from Reuter News Service or American Quotations Systems . To analyze basis.
behavior as contract maturity is approached, the Chicago basis was charted
for the final 25 days of trading on expiring futures contracts.
Chicago Com Basis - Figures 9 through 11 show the Chicago box car basis,
for corn for the final 25 days of trading in the March, May and July futures
contracts, for the years 1977 through 1979. Basis patterns for the years
1974 through 1976 are shown in Appei:|dix Figures 1 through 3. Costs for
making and receiving delivery also are shown in these figures. Costs of ,
making delivery on futures contracts are the horizontal lines below the zero
line on the basis chart; these costs include inspection, grading, interest,
insurance,, elevation and storage. Costs for moving com out of delivery
elfevators after it has been received on futures contracts are shown by the
1-1 4 f . .
i
horizontal line above the zero kin|. These costs include a loadout charge
along with weighing, inspection and grading. Additional charges would be
' ' ' ' ' ...
involved if the grain is load,ed out for water transport of if the grain is
• ' 12/- • i • c . • .
held in storage before loading it out.—
' ' ' i i . ' _.r • ^ -
•The corn basis in Figures 9 through 11 was calculated using closing futures
and closing cash boxcar bids. These charts indicate the Chicago corn basis
under expiring futures contracts in the last 15 days of trading was nearly
always within the range bounded by delivery costs. During the 1974-76 period,
the -basis tended to be above and below the expiring futures with about equal
frequency." Itius, it can be reasonably be concluded that basis patterns
indicate no major impediments to delivery on com futures occurred in these
years..
12/ Costs for making delivery at Chicago were itemized in a preceding
section. The costs to the receiver of such grain for m9ving it out of
delivery elevators were obtained through personal coiimiunication with
Chicago-grain trade officials and.from Chicago Board of Trade, Rules and
Regulations of the Board of Trade of" the City' of. Chicago, op^'cit;
Section 1620, p. 358.
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From 1977 through 1979, the charts show a com basis that consistently
tended to run below expiring futures and, in some cases, ran slightly below
delivery costs. At first glance, one might conclude the lower basis is a
sign of delivery problems. More likely, however, it reflects growing
obsolescence of boxcars as a method of transporting grain. Boxcars require
more labor for loading and unloading than hopper cars, and have a greater
tendency to develop leaks in transit. As a result, Chicago boxcar bids in
recent years have, carried a discount of several cents per bushel under grain
shipped in hopper cars.
Figures 12 through 14 show the Chicago hopper car basis for com relative
to expiring March, May and July futures for the past three years. In nearly
all cases during this period, the basis on these contracts was within the
range bounded by delivery costs. Hopper car basis data for Chicago for the
expiring September smd December futures contracts for 1974 through 1979 are
shown In Appendix Figures 7 throughilO. The basis for these contracts re
flected the same general pattern as shown by the March, May and July futures.
Variability of the Chicago corn basis during the last 25 days of trading
in the period studied here was relatively small in almost all cases. One exception,
however, was 1974 when the basis under March about 15 days before contract
maturity tended to be somewhat more variable than at other times. In other
years, there appeared to be little difference in basis variability during the
25-day period — except in the case of the December futures. The December
basis tended to be more variable early in the 25-day period, before gradually
converging into the range expected based on delivery costs as contract ex
piration approached. (See Appendix Figures 9 and 10). This pattern probably
reflects congestion of storage facilities, lack of transportation equipment,
and other harvest pressures that normally affect the Chicago basis in November.
Once harvesting is completed, these pressures usually diminish rapidly and
permit the Chicago com basis to move into line with delivery costs.
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From this analysis, it can be seen that.the,,three conditions specified
at the beginning of this section generally have been met by the Chicago corn
basis. For that reason, it was concluded that delivery on corn futures con
tracts has proceeded smoothly in-recent years, with .no evidence of serious im
pediments to delivery.
Chicago Soybean Basis Under ExplrlnR Futures Contracts - Figures 15 through
22 show the Chicago soybean basis under expiring May, July, August and November
futures contracts for ^he years 1974 through 1979 and corresponding delivery
costs. In these charts, two differences from the preceding corn prices" should
be noted. First, published, Chicago, cash soybean prices do not make a distinction
between boxcar and hopper car shipments. Trade sources indicate a high per--
centage of soybeans sold in.Chicago cash, markets normally•is.delivered by truck;
this may account, for lack of distinction between box and hopper-car bids. -
Secondly, •the basic grade specified.in the futures contract Is^No. 2:yellow,
whereas Chicago cas^prices are based„on No. l.soybeans. • Price differ^rices
between the two grades.will vary,-slightly from time to time, depending on market
conditions. Futures contracts provide a.fixed-3 cent per bushel .premium for- '
No. 1 spybeans; for simplification.this .premium was-used in adjusting delivery
costs to a cash market equivalent. Cost-of making delivery on soybean futures
were reduced by 3 cents per bushel due to the ability to obtain a lower grade
for delivery. On the other hand,.;costs to ,those receiving delivery were in
creased by 3cents per bushel to.reflect added costs, of moving up to the No. I,
grade, .level .which is comparable to cash prices-
As Figure 15 indicates, the basis under expiring. May. futures, followed the'
expected pattern,for. the years, 1974-1976 -- a pattern similar to that shown for
expiring corn futures, contracts. For most other, years shown here, however, the
soybean basis traced out an erratic pattern as the futures contract approached
maturity. For example, the Chicago basis under May during the last 25 days of
-50-
Cradtnft in 1977 ranged from 38 under to 3 under and closed out at approximately
17 under. The corresponding range in 1978 was from 38 under to 11 under,
closing out at 23.5 under. During these two years, an incentive for delivery
appeared to exist. However, rapid fluctuations in the basis may have discouraged
traders from attempting to make delivery. In 1979, the expiring May basis
reverted back to the pattern that would be expected if no major obstacles to
delivery are present.
In Figure 17, the basis under expiring July futures during 1974 and 1975
is shown to be slightly erratic, but closed out within the range anticipated by
delivery costs. The 1976 basis, however, w^s highly erratic with variability
tending to increase as contract maturity approached. During the final eight
days of trading, the basis fluctuated within a ten cent per bushel range,
closing out at a level moderately below delivery costs. A similar pattern of
varaibility is evident for the years 1977 and 1979, as shown in Figure 18 .
The August and November basis also show tendencies for basis variability to
increase during the final five to ten days of trading before the contract
expires, as shown in Figures 19 through 22 ,
These basis patterns suggest the delivery process has proceeded much less
stnoothly on soybean futures than on com. In several instances the Chicago
soybean basis at contract expiration was below futures quotations by more than
the delivery costs. Also, the Chicago soybean basis in many cases tended to
exhibit a downward bias from futures quotations, rather than being above and
below expiring futures with approximately equal frequency. Uncertainty about
the Chicago basis at contract expiration would tend to cause a wider basis at
other locations than would be expected if delivery were functioning smoothly.
In effect, the added basis uncertainty would teake soybean hedging returns for
-51-
country elevators and farmers less certain than on corn. Increased uncertainty
would be compensated for through wider merchandising margins at country elevators
and other locations in the marketing system. As evidence of this, the previous
sections on Iowa basis patterns indicate that in each case where the Iowa soy
bean basis exceeded delivery costs, the Chicago basis also exceeded its delivery
costs. In some cases, however, strong demand at Gulf ports kept the Iowa basis
smaller than the delivery costs even though the Chicago basis exceeded costs
of delivering on expiring futures contracts.
From this analysis, it can be concluded that variability in the Chicago
soybean basis in recent years has been large enough to warrant concern by
producers. At least two or three factors may have contributed to such vari
ability. First, soybean carryover stocks were relatively low during much of
the period studied and would tend to result in small deliverable supplies being
available at Chicago. Since Chicago is outside the main movement pattern of
soybeans to export markets, supplies at the delivery point could at times be
tighter than at other locations. The addition of Toledo, Ohio as an alternative
delivery point starting with the September 1979 futures contract may somewhat
reduce the problem of small deliverable supplies,
A second factor which may at times contribute to variability of the Chiago
basis is a reoccurring shortage of rail equipment for shipment of grains and
oilseeds. If this was the major cause of variability in the Chicago basis,
however, a similar pattern would be expected in the Chicago corn basis. A third
possible influence on the basis at contract expiration could be the transit
billing requirement for delivery. It is not clear whether this billing reflects
the typical shipment pattern for cash beans moving into Chicago, or whether it
creates an artificial difference between the value of soybean futures contracts
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and cash prices. In the latter case, the costs of providing transit billing
could make traders reluctant to attempt delivery on futures contracts except
when the basis is very wide.
VI. POTENTIAL RETURNS FROM CORN AND SOYBEAN
STORAGE HEDGES IN IOWA
There are two different types of hedges that can be used by Iowa grain
producers in pricing their corn and soybean crops: (1) storage hedges and
(2) pre-harvest hedges. In each case, the crop or some fraction of it is
priced by selling futures contracts. Later, when the crop is sold in the local
cash market, the futures contracts are bought back. In so doing, the position
in the futures market is liquidated. This procedure works as a hedge (or
method of establishing the price) since any decline in cash prices during the
course of the hedge would be approximately offset by a gain from the futures
position. Conversely, if prices strengthen during the life of the hedge, a gain
in cash prices will be approximately offset by a loss in futures trading.
Hedging thus enables a producer to take advantage of attractive prices -- if
they should occur before he is ready to physically market his grain. Hedging
in futures markets has a potential advantage over contracting at the local
elevator -- the futures position can easily be reversed if it becomes clear
that market conditions have changed substantially. However, this advantage
should be exercised cautiously since it could cause the producer to begin
trading in and out of the market for quick profits. Such a strategy could
lead to increased rather than reduced price risks. At times when the basis in
elevator contracts appears to be wider than normal, direct use of the future
market can also be advantageous to corn and soybean growers.
-61-
The main difference between a pre-harvest hedge and a storage hedge
is that the- latter involves no production risk." A storage hedge is a
method oC pricing the crop in the futures market .after it has been har
vested and placed in storage.' Storage hedges typically•are used to earn
storage income, and may aid in-shifting-crop income into the next year for
tax management pruposes,. Pre-harvest-or new crop hedges, on the other hand,
always involve some production risk. In a pre-harvest hedge, a portion of
the crop is priced during or before the growing season. This exposes
the producer to risk that-yields might not measure up .to expectations and
that the crop may have been over-sold. Alternatives for dealing with the
production risk include (1) use of hail insurance and/or all-risk crop
insurance if available and -(2) selling^less than the entire crop before
harvest—to allow for a .possible short-fall in yields.
Results From Com Storage Hedges
' ! r' ' : •
In analyzing returns from com storage hedges, three different
hedging programs were considered: (1) three months' storage (2) six month^
storage and (3) storage into late June. Marketing in late June would involve
abour eight months* storage except in years when the peak-harvest period
extends into November. Thus, with a typical harvest season, these programs
would involve cash sales and lifting of hedges in January, April arid June.
Hedging retums were computed using the basis under July futures during the
peak harvest period and the basis-under July at the time the hedges would
be lifted. Gross returns available to producers through storage hedges
were compared with gross returns from unhedged storage for the same lengths
of time, for the 1974-75 through 1978-79 marketing years. Retums for un-
-62-
hedged storage were determined by computing the price change from harvest
time until later in the year. The results from these alternatives are
summarized in Table 8 for the six price reporting districts. Gross returns
by district for individual years are shown in appendix Tables 13 through 18.
The results shown in Table 1 indicate gross returns from three-month
corn storage hedges varied by only a few cents per bushel from one district
to another. For six-month hedges and hedges carried into June, the varia
bility of returns from one district to another was somewhat greater. In
each case, hedging returns were slightly greater in the river-oriented
areas—Southeast and Northeast districts—than elsewhere. If all costs of
storage along with hedging expenses at 2 cents per bushel are considered,
average three-month returns were about equal to expenses of commercial
storage. For six months* and eight months' storage, typical commercial
storage costs would have modestly exceeded gross hedging returns. However,
the gross hedging returns in all three alternatives would have exceeded
typical variable costs for on-farm storage*
The "range of returns" column in Table 8 shows the variation in returns
over the five-year study period. For example, hedging returns for three
months* storage in the Northwest district ranged from a low of 17 cents per
bushel in 1978-79 to a high of 34 cents in 1977-78, That's a range of 17
cents per bushel from the highest to the lowest return over the five-year
period. The variability or range of storage hedging returns tended to be
slightly greater for Northeast Iowa than for other price reporting districts.
For all districts, the variability of returns was smallerfor three-month
hedges than for the two longer storage hedging programs studied here.
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From these results, three general conclusions can be dravm: (1)
for corn stored at the elevator, net returns have tended to be greater for
three-month hedges than for the other two alternatives, (2) for corn stored
on the farm, net returns over variable costs from six-month hedges would
generally be greater than returns from the other two alternatives, and
(3) variability of returns increases modestly as corn storage hedges are
held beyond three months.
Returns for Unhedged Corn Storage
Table 8 also shows comparable returns for unhedged corn storage. In
all districts, returns for unhegded storage in each of the three alternatives
were moderately below hedging returns. The Northwest district offered the
greatest potential gain in returns for storage hedges—with gross-hedging
returns for all three alternatives being about 22 cents per bushel above
unhedged returns. For most other districts, hedging returns were 10 to
16 cents greater than unhedged returns. In all cases, commercial storage
costs (including interest, and extra drying and shrinkage below No. 2
grade) would have exceeded unhedged corn storage returns. Thus, unhedged
storage of com at the elevator would not have been profitable. Unhedged
returns were about equal to variable costs of on-farm storage in most cases.
However, Northwest Iowa was the exception—average returns for unhedged
corn storage in this district would not have covered variable costs of on-
farm storage.
Two conclusions stand out in the "range of returns" columns for unhedged
storage. First, the year-to-year variability of returns from unhedged storage
is substantial and increases as the length of storage period increases. In
-65-
Northwest Iowa, storage returns into late June varied by $1.36 per bushel
over the five-year study period. In other districts, variability for this
alternative ranged from §.89 to §1.03 per bushel. Secondly,•the range of
returns over the study period in all cases was substantially smaller
with the hedging alternatives than with unhedged storage.
Implications For Producers In Marketing Com
These results show an important potential role for storage hedges in
marketing corn. During the past five crop marketing years, storage hedges .
offered a greater average return than unhedged storage—and with less year-. .
to-year variability in returns. It should be recognized that four of the
last five years were characterize^ by increasing carryovef stocks, large
crops and serious transportation problems. These conditions have tended
to keep the basis wide at harvest-time, thus increasing potential hedging ,
returns. Returns from hedging would compare less favorably with unhedged
storage in years of declining carryover stocks.
Results From Soybean Storage Hedges
Gross returns for soybean hedges and comparisons with unhedged storage
are" shown in Table 9, using the same format as the preceding section on com.
Hedged and unhedged soybean storage returns for individual years from 1974-75
through 1978-79 are shown in Appendix Tables 19 through 24. For three-months'
storage hedges, average gross retums in most districts during the study period
were about equal to storage and interest costs of off-farm storage. Thus, the.
three-month alternative would have provided approximately a breakeven situation
for soybeans stored at the elevator. Retums for three-months*'Oh-farm
storage and hedging would have modestly exceeded variable costs.
Gross retums increased at a decreasing' rate for soybean storage hedges
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held more than three months. In all cases, average six and eight months*
hedging returns fall well short of full costs for storage at local elevators.
Six months' storage hedges would have approximately covered interest cost for
soybeans in on-farm storage, while average eight-month returns in most cases
did not fully cover interest costs on the soybean inventory. Gross returns
for eight-month storage hedges ranged from 44 cents per bushel in North Central
Iowa to 50 cents in thp two eastern'districts. The variability of returns from
soybean hedges'was substantially larger than for corn, with six-month soybean
hedges showing more variability than the other two alternatives.
As with com, gross soybean hedging returns were slightly larger in the
i
two eastern districts than in otlier areas of the state. Larger returns in these
districts probably reflect a narrowing basis at river terminals during the
spring navigation season and less uncertainty about availability of transpor
tation than in other areas." Uncertainty about transportation would be reflected
in- a wider than normal basis to coveij late penalties and other costs of shipping
delays.
Returns From'Unhedged Soybean Storage^
Table^9 indicates three months' storage" of soybeans without'hedging hasI
generated large year-to-year variations in returns, with average returns being
less than typical costs of both coiranercial and on-farm storage. Thus, routine
unhedged soybean storage for three months has not been an attractive marketing
•alternative during the study period.
Unhedged storage of soybeans for six months beyond harvest in all except
two districts provided larger gross returns than storage hedges. The two ex
ceptions were northeastern and northwest Iowa. Except for the northwest district,
average returns from six months* unhedged storage would have exceeded variable
-68-
costs of on-farm storage. In most cases, the average gross returns would have
fallen slightly short of total costs Cor storage at the elevator—thus making
off-larm scorage unproL'Irable.
For both the six-month and eight-month unhedged storage, the year-to-year
variability of returns was extremely large,. In many cases, it was five times
as great as the variability of returns in the hedged alternative. The range of
returns varied somewhat from district to district, depending on weather conditions,
timing of the peak harvest period and other factors. For example, harvest
pressures in South Central Iowa in the fall of 1974 occurred earlier than in
other areas. Prices during the first half of October that year were supported
by frost damage to the soybean crop in the northern cornbelt and delayed harvesting
in some areas. Mid-October prices were used for South Central Iowa in computing
1974-75 storage returns. In other districts, harvest pressures came slightly
later, with lower prices. Since 1974-75 was a year of declining prices, the
decline was greater in South Central Iowa than in other areas because of a higher
harvest-time base price. The severe decline in soybean prices during 1974-75
was a major factor behind the wide range of returns from unhedged soybean storage.
Implications for Producers in Marketing Soybeans
Storage hedges appear to be a less effective tool in marketing soybeans
than in corn. In nearly all cases examined here, hedging returns would not
have covered full costs of off-farm storage, including interest on the soybean
inventory. Thus, routine hedging of soybeans stored at the elevator appeared
to offer little or no profit potential. A modest return over interest costs
was available for three months' on-farm hedges, although average returns from
six and eight-month oii-farm storage hedges would have approximately matched
interest costs on the soybeans.
In nearly all districts, six and eight-month on-farm hedges provided lower
average returns than unhedged storage of soybeans. Unhedged returns modestly
exceeded interest costs of on-farm storage but generally did not cover full
-69-
costs of storage in commercial facilities. Over a period of years, unhedged
soybean storage for six and eight months would be expected to proyide greater
returns than storage hedges.
However, two other aspects of storage hedges should be noted. First,
hedging returns were much less variable, from year to year than returns from
unhedged storage. Soybean hedges may be a useful tool for farmers who wish
to reduce the financial risk' from large year-to-year variations in soybean storage
returns. In addition, hedging returns could be greater than the five-year
average results shown here if producers use a selective hedging program. Such
a program might involve jiedg'ing only, In years of a short U.S. crop and in years
when the harvest-time basis is unusually wide. In other years, the soybeans
might be stored without hedging, sold at harvest or priced during the summer
through pre-harvest hedges or elevator contracts for harvest delivery.
VII POTENTIAL RETURNS FROM PRE-HARVEST
CORN AND SOYBEAN HEDGES AND CONTRACTS
This phase of the study was directed toward evaluating the role of
preharvest hedges and contracts as tools for marketing Ibwa corn and soybean •
crops and in reducing the risks from volatile grain prices. The Iowa Depart
ment of Agriculture began reporting district new-crop contracting prices in.
mid-1976, two years after the cash-price reporting system was initiated. ,
For that reason, new-crop prices analyzed here will include only the 1976-
through 1979 marketing years.
The futures market can be used to price an up-coming crop.as much as a
year in advance of harvest. This would be done by selling November or
December futures contracts that mature during the year the crop will be.har
vested. For example, let's say an Iowa farmer anticipated in the fall of 1979
-70-
that he would harvest AOO acres of corn in October and November of 1980. If
his corn yields 100 bushels per acre, his total 1980 production would amount to
AO,000 bushels. Suppose he decided distant futures contracts were offering an
acceptable price and wished to price one-eight of his expected 1980 crop. This
could be done by selling one 5,000 bushel December 1980 futures contract. If
prices eventually declined, the lower cash price would be offset by a gain in
his futures position. If prices rose, higher cash prices would be offset by a
loss in the futures position. In effect, the farmer would receive protection
against lower prices, but would give up the opportunity to gain if prices
rose. If futures prices remain at satisfactory levels, he might decide to make
additional new-crop sales the next summer when his production prospects
are more certain.
With uncertain weather and production ri^ks, most farmers have been
reluctant to price their crops a year in advance, and understandably so. Be
cause of these uncertainties, the analysis here focuses on more typical new-
crop pricing strategies: selling part of the expected crop in early June;
mid-July, mid-August and mid-September. These marketing periods involve less
production risks than earlier sales, although fall or winter of the preceding
year may be an appropriate marketing time in some situations. Procedures for
pricing a growing crop during the spring or summer would be the same as in the
example of the previous paragraph.
New-Crop Com Hedglna and Contracting Results
Comparisons of average results from hedging and contracting a growing
corn crop during the four selected periods in late spring and summer are shown
In Table 10, for each of the six price reporting districts. New-crop hedging
and contracting results for individual years are presented in Appendix
Tables 25 through 30.
-71-
Hedging prices shown in these tables were computed using December futures
quotations at the time the pricing decision was made and deducting the actual
harvest-time (October-November) basis for the same year. In addition, hedging
costs of two cents per bushel were deducted to cover the expenses of trading
In com futures contracts.
The data in Table 10 indicate that in almost all cases, the average
elevator contracting price was within one to three cents per bushel of the price
that could be obtained through direct hedging in the futures market. One
exception was in early June, when only two years contracting prices were
available. Since the hedging prices for early June reflect a four-year average,
they are not directly comparable ,with the average results from elevator contracts,
The other exception was in mid-August in South Central Iowa, where the average
hedging price was five cents per bushel above the elevator contracting
price.
Hedging prices for mid-July through mid-September were at or slightly
above elevator contracting prices in the Southeast, South Central and South
west price reporting districts. However, in the three northern districts,
no clear pattern of differences between elevator contracts and hedging
prices was evident.
Analysis of hedging and contracting prices for individual years (see
Appendix Tables 25-30) revealed a tendency for hedging prices to be above
elevator contracting prices the first three years of the period studied
here, with the difference generally being widest in 1978. In several
districts that year, reported new-crop elevator contracting prices were as
much as seven to twelve cents per bushel below prices obtained through
hedging. Hov^ver, Northwest Iowa was an exception—with contracting and
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hedging prices being nearly identical;• In 1979,'the pattern was reversed.
The grain-trade did not fully anticipate the extent of labor, transportation
and storage space-problems "in 1979 until harvest time had arrived. These
developments severely.depressed the October and November corn basis. As
a resultelevator contracting-prices in early summer 1979 in several cases
were as much as ten to twenty-'cents per bushel above prices that would have ,
been received through direct sales of" December futures- contracts.
Role of New-Crop Hedging and- Contracting in Marketing Corn
From this analysis; no continually reoccurring.price advantage of
hedging over local elevator contracts was. evident.' However, farmers with good
knowledge and'understanding of. local basis patterns may .have been able to
increase their net com price several cents per bushel by carefully- comparing
contracting and hedging alternatives each year. • Such a comparison could have
led to -a selective hedging strategy involving direct use of futures markets
in some years and use of elevator contracts in others.
Table-10 also indicates that routine elevator.,contracting or tiew;-crop
hedging in early. June and mid-July during the last four.years would have
provided prices substantially above the harvest-time average. In.other words,
these tools offered farmers an opportunity to "lock in" prices above the
average for the corresponding harvest period. In all.districts, a price
advantage of twenty to twenty-five cents per bushel- was available by forward
pricing corn'in early summer,.- However, delaying; the pricing decision until
mid-August'would have-resulted-in slightly lower prices than occurred at,,
harvest. Average mid-September new^crop.prices•in all districts recovered,,
slightly from the "-previous month and were a few cents above average harvest-
time'prices. Whether or not similar monthly pricing patterns occur in-
future years will depend heavily on the level of carryover stocks and on crop
prospects during the summer.
-Ik-
One other important aspect of hedging and contracting is the year-to-
year variability of income resulting from their use. Table 10 indicates
that during the past four years, routine hedging and/or contracting in
early June would have produced much less variability in prices than actually
occurred at harvest-time. For example, prices in Northwest Iowa were more
variable than in other districts—with average October-November prices
fluctuating in a $.56 per bushel range in the past four years. Early June
hedging prices, however, varied by only $.34 per bushel over the same
period. Thus, early June hedges and elevator contracts offered a higher
average price and less variable returns than harvest-time sales.
In all cases, routine hedging or contracting of new-crop corn during the
past four years in mid-July, mid-August or mid-September resulted in sub
stantially greater variability of returns than sa.les at harvest. Each district
showed the greatest variability of new-crop prices in mid-September. From
these observations, it was concluded that routine forward pricing of new-
crop corn from mid—summer onward in recent years, would not have stabilized
prices received ty Iowa cash grain producers. In fact, such marketing
strategies actually would havQ caused greater variability of returns from
corn sales than harvest-time!raarketings.
In short, hedging and contracting early in the growing season offered a
potentially important role in marketing new-crop corn during the past four
years. These alternatives, if us^d routinely, would have increased the
average price .above levels actually received at barest. At the same time,
they offered an opportunity to substantially reduce year-to-year price
variability. These advantages were diminished or lost entirely if the
pricing decision was delayed tintil later in the summer.
-35t'
New-Crop- Soybean Hedging and Contracting Results
Results from routine forward pricing of new-crop soybeans for harvest
delivery during the past four summers are shown by price reporting districts
in Table 11. Pricing outcomes for individual years are presented in
Appendix Tables 31 through 36. Except for two^minor differences, new-crop
soybean pricing strategies considered here were identical to those in the
previous section on com. The first exception was that soybean hedges for
harvest delivery involved sdles of November soybean futures contracts,
whereas corn hedging was based on sales of the December futures. Secondly,
soybean hedging prices shown here include a deduction of four cents per
bushel to reflect typical costs of futures trading. A two-cent hedging cost
deduction was used in the corn analysis. r-
Results from routine pre-harvest pricing of soybeans differed from
corn in two important ways. First, average contracting prices in all dis
tricts and for all four alternatives studied here were above prices ob
tained by direct use of the futures market—with one exception. The ex
ception was mid-August pricing in South Central Ipwa,'where hedging and
contracting prices were identical,• Otherwise, average-elevator contracting
prices generally were above hedging outcomes by three to eleven cents per
bushel. The greatest advantages from elevator contracting occurred in the
North Central, Southeast and" Northwest price reporting districts in that,
order. In North Central Iowa, average elevator contracting prices 'from
mid-July through mid-September ranged from eight to eleven cents per bushel
above prices available through hedging. In contrast to corn, Appendix'
Tables ;31 through 36 Indicate new-crop elevator contracts for soybeans pro
vided a-price adyanta^^p over hedging most of the. time during the last four
" ' " "j- _ ' [• • , . - I,'•
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years. Pricing alternatives for com showed an advantage for elevator
contracts mainly in the last year of the study period.
The other way in which new-crop soybean pricing results differed from
com was in variability of returns. Routine early summer hedging and
contracting reduced the variability of soybean prices only slightly when
compared to harvest-time sales. These same alternatives were much more
effective in reducing variability of corn prices. For soybeans, the
greatest variability in harvest-time prices occurred in the Northeast and
Southeast districts. Pricey at harvest in these two districts varied by
$1.55 and $1.58 per bushel respectively during the four-year study period.
Greater variability of prices in these areas may reflect larger year-to-
year variations in barge freight rates than in the regulated rail shipping
rates of other areas. Early summer hedges in all districts generated
slightly greater variability of returns than elevator contracts. By mid-
August, variability of hedging returns dropped substantially below those
for elevator contracts. Then, In mid-September the variability of returns
from the two alternatives was nearly identical.
Implications to Producers In Marketing New-Crop Soybeans
The results In Table 11 Indicate new-crop hedging and contracting
can play a potentially important role in pricing soybeans during the first
half of the summer and in mid-September. Routine hedging or contracting at
these times would have generated moderately higher prices than occurred at
harvest time. For example, routine contracting in mid-July provided prices
from 54 to 61 cents per bushel above average harvest-time markets. For a
soybean grower harvesting 200 acres of soybeans with a yield of 36 bushels
per acre, use of this alternative routinely could have increased his average
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annual net income by up to $3,900 to $A.400 as compared with harvest-time
sales. Average results from mid-August hedges and contracts would have cut
cash receipts from soybeans slightly below harvest-time sales, while forward
pricing in mid-September provided a modest advantage over harvest selling.
Whether this pattern continues in future years will depend heavily on
summer weather conditions and crop prospects. In years when the growing
season is favorable, the monthly pattern of new-crop prices is likely to be
similar to the average pattern shown here for the past four years. In years
v^en growing conditions are adverse, one might expect late summer and early
fall forward pricing alternatives to be more attractive than those available
in June and July.
Results from the 1976 through 1979 period show little or no price
incentive for routinely hedging new-crop soybeans. In fact, most of the
time during this period, reported elevator contracts offered a price advan
tage over hedging. Finally, routine contracting or hedging of new-crop soy
beans should not be expected to greatly reduce variability of prices received
by farmers. Year-to-year fluctuation in new-crop soybean prices during the
summer were nearly as large, and in some cases even larger than fluctuations
in harvest-time prices. Even so, selective forward selling of new-crop soy
beans can be an Important risk-management tool for soybean growers. This
technique would involve sales of new-crop soybeans at times when (1) prices
are above the individual producer's cash cost of production and/or (2) prices
are moderately above the expected season average price for the coming year.
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VIII. COMPARISON OF PRICES AND HEDGING POTENTIAL
ON THE MIDAMERICA COMMODITY EXCHANGE AND
THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE n/
As noted earlier in this report, Iowa farmers have two alternatives avail
able when using futures markets to price corn or soybeans: the Midamerica
Exchange (MAE) and the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). Com and soybean
trading regulations and futures contracts on the two markets are nearly iden
tical. except for size. The MAE grain contracts are traded in 1.000 bushel
units, while the CBOT contracts specify 5,000 bushels of com and soybeans.
In recent years, a sizeable number of brokerage firms across the midwest has
begun providing trading services in MAE contracts as well as CBOT futures.
Thus, potential access to MAE trading by farmers has been increasing. lA/
MAE and CBOT Pricing Procedures
Both futures markets are lopg-established organizations dating back into
the nineteenth century. Both also are regulated by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC), an agency of the federal government established by
Congress in 1974 to regulate the commodity futures industry. However, one
important difference betweer\ the two markets is that daily high and low prices
for the MAE are not published and thus are not readily available for analysis
by farmers, MAE closing prices are published and are identical to CBOT
closes but closing prices give no indication of trading ranges during the day.
To determine whether effective hedging opportunities exist in MAE contracts,
this phase of the study involved collection and analysis of a large number of
13/ This section is based on H. Alan Carver, Analysis of Corn and Soybean
Cash-Futures Price Relationships in North Central Iowa, Unpublished Master
of Science Thesis, Iowa State University (Ames, Iowa) 1978, pp. 59-77.
14/ Based on personal communication with officials of the MAE,
— I
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indivldual transactions in MAE contracts. Daily and minute by minute prices
on the MAE contracts were compared with prices occurring simultaneously
in the same contract delivery months on the CBOT, to determine whether futures
prices in the two markets are identical.
One feature of the MAE which should tend to keep its prices in line
with those on the CBOT is the arbitrage phone, located in the MAE trading pit.
This is a direct "hot line" to the floor of the CBOT. If prices in the two
markets differ significantly, MAE traders can pick up the arbitrage phone,
buy CBOT contracts and sell comparable contracts on the MAE or vice versa.
This arbitrage process would be expected to continue until prices in the two
markets are approximately equal.
To better understand the research reported here, a few brief observations
about the price recording procedures on the exchanges are necessary. The
two exchanges have different methods of recording "time and sales" data to
provide a history of each day's futures transactions. "Time and sales"
records show the date, time of day. contract month traded and price at which the
contract traded. The resulting information becomes a part of the files of the
exchange and is available to indicate to the public the price at which a
particular futures contract was being traded at a particular point in time.
MAE "time and sales" data were being recorded manually at the time price data
were obtained for this study (1977). During periods of heavy trading, physical
limitations of the individual in time stamping the records could possibly
cause brief lags in price recording. Also, small differences between the time
clocks on the two exchanges might exist in some cases. Computerized record
keeping was being utilized at the CBOT at the time of this study. This too
could lead to slight differences between the two exchanges in the time
K
required, to record transactions. For. these reasons, it should be apparent that
slight differences can occur in the time at which prices in the two markets^ are
recorded . i ^ • • • . -
In the analysis rep,orted here, fifteen days with substantial variability
in corn .and soybean futures prices during the years 1976 .and 1977 were.
selected for analysis. It was believed that if prices on.the two exchanges are
equal during days with large price changes, they also are likely to be
!•. 1,,
identical at times when the range of,-daily prices is smaller. Plaices on
futures transactions thrqughout each of the days analyzed here were obtained
through a personal visit to the MAE and CBOT.
MAE versus CBQT Soybean Prices " . • •
In the days selected for analysis,,soybean, futures prices for the same
contract months on"the MAE and CBOT-.were exactly equal within a one-minute
time interval 90.1 percentrof the time. If-we include trades in which prices
differed by no more than one-ha5.f cent ,per bushel in the one minute interval,
the percentage increases to 98.3 percent. Out .of 1,604 soybean .price compari
sons, only ten trades showed a price difference of more than one cent per bushel
between the two exchanges. Since MAE,trading has been concentrated more
heavily in near-by futures contracts, while distant futures are more useful
^ ' X'. ...
for producer hedges, a separate analysis also was made of distant contracts.
• For 'contracts four" months or more from expiration, soybean prices on the two
exchanges differed by one cent or more-^per bushel in only 2.2 percent of the
trades studied here,-
^ MAE versus CBOT Comr. Prices ^ '
Mt is logical to expect a-greater difference-between soybean, futures prices'
on the two exchanges than corn. Soybean prices historically have traded in
wider ranges., with more rapid changes than'ln the corn market.' Also, the
higher level of soybean prices means that a given percentage variation in
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prices would result in a larger cents per bushel difference in beans than in
corn.
Actual price differences for corn followed the expected pattern. For the
days studied here, corn prices were exactly equal on the two exchanges within
a one-minute time interval 84.3 percent of the time. Using a one-fourth cent
variation, the percentage rose to 99.4 percent. Out of 319 corn trades ex
ecuted at MAE, only two were found to differ by more than one-fourth cent per,
bushel from the CBOT in the one-minute time internal.
Other Considerations
Volume of trading at MAE is an additional factor to consider in evaluating
its potential use as a hedging market. To be useful as a hedging market, the
volume of trading must be sufficient to allow prompt execution of futures
transactions at all times. A low volume of trading could possibly cause
problems for hedgers at times in placing or removing hedges. Table 12
shows volumes of trading on MAE and CBOT com and soybean contracts for the
years 1973 through 1978 and comparisons with the CBOT. MAE trading in
numbers of corn contracts ranged from 4 to 17 percent of the CBOT volume.
For soybeans, it ranged from 10 to 20 percent.
Table 12. Number of Corn and Soybean Futures Contracts Traded Annually at the
Midamerica Commodity Exchange and the Chicago Board of Trade, 1973
Through 1978.
Corn Contract
Chicago Board % of
Year Midamerica of Trade
1978 256,022 6,127,099
1977 280,268 5,021,827
1976 418,715 4,609,259
197.5 802,173 4,839,048
1974 760,521 4,679,042
1973 512,855 4,074,835
a/ Sources: Personal Communication
MAE as Soybean Contracts MAE as.
Chicago Board % of %
CBOT Midamerica of Trade CBOT
*
4 994,932 8,477.277 12
6 1,104,763 7,996,139 14
*
9 700,466 5,474,179 13
17 657,132 3,913,390 17
16 557,348 2,731,297 20 -
13 282,732 2,742,306 10
of the City of Chicago (Chicago, Illinois) 1974 through 1978 issues.
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Frotn the information reported here, it was concluded that MAE futures
contracts represent a potentially useful marketing tool for com and soy
bean growers. The smaller contracts can be valuable to producers who
wish to gain experience in hedging on a small scale. They also can aid
small and medium-size producers in spreading out marketings and in more closely
matching marketings with expected com and soybean production than would be
possible through the 5.000 bushel contracts. This feature is particularly
important to soybean growers since the typical Iowa producer's entire crop
would be equivalent to only one or two COBT contracts.
Example of Hedging Flexibility With Smaller Soybean Contracts
Consider an Iowa soybean grower who raises 200 acres of soybeans with an
average yield of 40 bushels per acre. With this yield, he would have 8,000
bushels of soybeans to market. If the beans are hedged on the CBOT, his
sales would need to be limited to one contract. Additional sales would
involve speculation on part of the crop and would increase price risk rather
than reducing it. However, if the crop is hedged on the MAE, eight individual
contracts could be sold and sales could be spread out over eight different
trades.
Table 13 illustrates potential benefits from spreading out sales, with
an example based on actual 1977 November futures prices. In this situation,
only 5,000 of the 8,000 bushel crop were hedged. On March 17, 1977, our Iowa
soybean grower determined that November futures contracts offered him a local
hedging price of $6.65 for soybeans to be harvested and marketed thenext
fall. Let's suppose he considered this an acceptable price and decided to begin
sales of new-crop soybeans. If CBOT futures were utilized. 5,000 bushels or
63 percent of his expected crop would have to be sold in the intital
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cransactlon. An alternative strategy would be to use MAE contracts, spreading
out sales on a rising market if U.S. or world weather concerns should bring
an up-trend in prices. Such a strategy would also permit the producer to
evaluate his own crop potential and U.S. crop prospects as the season pro
gressed, and to adjust sales accordingly. The last colximn of Table 13 shows
Table 13* Comparison of 1977 Soybean Hedging Returns From Spreading Out
New-Crop Sales Versus One Large Sale In a Single Futures Trade.
Date of Futures Expected Expected
Sale Contract Month Contract Prices Local Basis Hedged Prices
March 17, 1977 November $7.15 -$.50 $6.65
April 18, 1977 November 7.70 - .50 7.20
May 24, 1977 November 7.55 - .50 7.05
June 6, 1977 November 7.90 - .50 7.40
June 29, 1977 November 7.08 - .50 6.58
$6.97
average hedged price—five individual sales
the results from this strategy in 1977, with sales being spread from
mid-March through late June. In this case, the average hedged price was
$6.97 per bushel—32 cents higher than would have been received from a
single 5,000 bushel sale in mid-March. At the end of June, the producer
had sold slightly less than two-thirds of his expceted production, thus leaving
some flexibility in case yields should be less than anticipated. From a
slightly different perspective, his sales level had reached twenty-five bushels
per acre by late June,
The example shown here is only one of many potential strategies, and illus
trates results for one individual year. The level of sales could be held below
that indicated here if the producer is concerned about serious yield losses on
his farm. Marketings could also be spread over a longer time period, if desired.
In 1977, North Central Iowa cash prices at harvest time dropped to about $5.70
per bushel. Thus, both hedging strategies illustrated here were profitable
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although the alternative of spreading'out sales provided a greater return
than a single large sale' in the futures-markefi ' ' " '
An additional consideration in the-choice between MAK and CBOT con-.
tracts is the cost of the futures transaction. Brokerage fees for
trading in'grain futures are negotiated and-may vary slightly from one
brokerage firm to another; Fees .for trading in MAE contracts usually are
slightly higher per bushel than for CBOT contracts. The higher brokerage .
fees generally would increase' futures-trading costs by one to two' cents'per
bushel as compared, with the" 5,000 bushel CBOT contracts. • Individual situations
and volume of grain hedged would deferm^-ne-whether the added flexibility
justifies the small additional cost per bushel for the 1,000"bushel contracts.
•• : ^
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IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Results reported here show a potentially important role for foward pric
ing in marketing Iowa corn and soybean crops. However, effective forward pric
ing — either through local elevator contracts or by direct use of the futures
market — requires information about local basis and factors affecting it.
Important factors causing year-to-year changes in the basis include freight
rates, other costs of marketing grain, local supply and demand conditions,
uncertainty about availability of transportation, services, and market con
ditions at futures delivery points. During the past five years, these various
factors have caused a sharp increase in the Iowa corn and soybean basis, with
the impact being greater on soybeans than on corn and greater in the Northwest
and North Central price reporting districts than in other areas. Even with
an uncertain and increasing basis, however, several forward sales programs
examined here would have provided significantly higher prices than unhedged
alternatives if used routinely during the past five years.
Delivery Costs and the Iowa Basis
To determine whether incentives for delivery of Iowa corn and soybeans on
futures contracts have occurred in recent years, costs of delivering these
commodities were compiled for each of the six price reporting districts.
With an effectively functioning delivery mechanism, these costs should also
set a maximum limit on the Iowa basis as futures contracts approach maturity.
The delivery cost analysis revealed that (1) delivery costs have increased
60 to 80 percent in the five-year study period, (2) the cost differential
between Northwest and Southeast Iowa increased by 5 to 11 cents per bushel in
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same time, (3) the Iowa corn basis under expiring futures in nearly all cases
was substantially smaller than delivery costs and (4) in most cases (but with
two important exceptions) the soybean basis under expiring futures was smaller
than delivery costs. No incentive for delivery of Iowa corn on futures
contracts was found during the 1974—79 period examined here. Gulf export
markets normally dominate Iowa corn prices, causing the actual basis to be
smaller than delivery costs. For that reason, farmers will find basis patterns
for the most recent two or three year period and recent basis trends more
useful in evaluating forward pricing opportunities than delivery costs. A
similar conclusion was reached for soybeans except that in mid to late 1974
and in May 1978 slight incentives for delivery were found. With these excep
tions, the Iowa soybean basis generally was smaller than delivery costs. The
soybean basis in all price-reporting districts also was found to be much more
variable than the corn basis, thus creating more uncertainty in forward pricing
of soybeans than in corn,
• Effectiveness- of Chicago Delivery tMechanism , , , . .
. The Chicago futures market .is well known as the world corn and soybean
pricing center. Cash prices and the basis in other market areas thus are
related-'to Chicago prices. To determine-whether basis uncertainty, during- the
futures contract delivery .-period may be contributing to basis uncertainty in
other- areas,'analysis was^made of the Chicago basis during the last 25 days
of trading-before"contract expiration. , This,is the time period in whiqh
decisions about delivery^-on futures contracts are made. If no major impediments
to delivery- exists Chicago- cash prices should be expected to differ from futures
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prices by no more than the costs of making or receiving delivery on futures
contracts during the last several days of trading before contract expiration.
A greater differential would create incentives for delivery, thus forcing
cash and futures prices to approximately converge as the futures contracts
approach maturity.
The Chicago corn basis during the past five years followed the expected
pattern, with rash prices in almost all cases differing from the futures
quotations by no more than delivery costs as the futures contracts expired.
Also, the Chicago corn basis typically varied only slightly during the final
25 days of trading before contract expiration. Thus, there was no evidence
that impediments to delivery on Chicago corn futures contracts have contri
buted significantly to basis uncertainty either in Iowa or in the Chicago cash
market during the period studied here.
In contrast» the Chicago soybean basis was )iighly variable during the
final 25 days of trading before contract expiration. In several instances, the
basis as the contract ceased trading was substantially larger than the costs of
making delivery on futures contracts. These findings indicate the delivery
process on soybeans futures has proceeded much less smoothly than on corn.
Delivery problems may create added uncertainty in hedging, widening the soybean
basis and reducing hedging returns for short (selling) hedgers in other market
areas Including Iowa, Problems such as these would tend to make hedging returns
less certain on soybeans than on corn and would likely be compensated for
through larger marketing margins in che grain trade.
The addition of Toledo, Ohio as an alternate delivery point starting with
the September 1979 futures contract may reduce such problems. However, at
least an additional one to two years of trading will be needed to determine
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whether this is the case. Other possible-measures^to reduce-delivery problems
include additional delivery points; more stringent -futures position limits
during the final trading month, adjustment of' position" limits for. both hedgers
and speculators during the final' trading-month'based on deliverable .supplies,
and financial settlement of futures contracts :based on an established differ-
15/
ential from a specified cash market.— - - , ; ' '
Role of Producer Storage Hedges
Routine use of three, six and nine months corn storage hedges by Iowa
farmers during the past five years would have provided 4 to 22 cents per bushel
additional income over unhedged storage, with the exact amount of increase
varying from one district to another. In most cases the greatest potential
increase in returns by use of hedging was in the Northwest price reporting
district. At the same time, year-to-year variability of storage returns in
. all districts was substantially reduced by hedging. Basis patiterns are, a
useful guide in evaluating .storage returns; returns could have been increased
further through a selective hedging program involving use of storage hedges
- 1 ^ ^ .
when the basis was wide at harvest, and harvest sales at other times.
In the case of soybeans, routine three-month hedges provided greater
returns and much less variability than unhedged storage. However, in most
cases routine six and eight-month soybean storage hedges provided less return
than unhedged soybeans. Hedging for these two time periods^ however,' would
have provided less year-to-year variability of returns than unhedged storage.
These alternatives are discussed as possible measures for reducing wheat
delivery problems' in'R. •Heifner., -"Reporfon a Study of the torch 1979
Chicago Wheat Futures Contract," unpublished paper summarizing'results of
a U.S. Department of Agriculture study undertaken by request of the U,S,
Congress.
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Itole of New-Crop Contracting and Hedging
New-crop elevator contracting prices for harvest delivery were available
during the summer months for the past four years. These prices were compared
with prices available through direct use of futures markets and harvest-time
cash prices. In both corn and soybeans, routine new-crop pricing in early
June and mid-July offered moderately higher prices than occurred at harvest.
However, these opportunities disappeared if the pricing decision was delayed
beyond July, On the average, the corn prices available through local elevator
contracts were nearly identical with those available through direct use of
futures markets. However, in the first three years of the study period,
contracting prices were below hewing prices; in the final year the reverse was
true.
In contrast to corn, reported local elevator contract prices during the
past four years generally were at or above prices available through direct use
of futures markets. Thus, there appeared to be little or no price incentive
available for direct use of futures markets to hedge new-crop soybeans.
These results show a potentially important role for foward pricing as a
tool for marketing new-crop corn and soybeans. However, in deciding whether
or not to price part of a growing crop, producers also must consider risks that
an unexpected drop in yields per acre might place them In an oversold position.
Procedures that may help manage these risks include (1) hail insurance and
possibly all-risk crop insurance, (2) selling only a portion of expected pro
duction until yield prospects are relatively certain and (3) use of futures
markets as the pricing tool. A position in the futures market usually can be
reversed much more easily than a sale through an elevator contract, although
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tUere. maybe costs in doing so. Also, ttiis "greater flexibility of forward
pricing through futures contracts must be used carefully to avoid being placed
in a speculative position.and increasing price'risks.
Importance of Anticipating Basis Movements
The Iowa grain marketing and transportation system continues to be faced
with-pressures from rapidly rising fuel costs. Until these costs begin to
stabilize, further increases in the Iowa corn and soybean basis must be
anticipated in the-years ahead. - Producers can obtain an approximation of
potential basis levels as distant futures'expire by-looking at the'rate of
increase"in the local basis during'the'last year pr two. This increase can
then be added to the current basis under nearby futures, along-with any
appropriate adjustments for unusual transportation situations, accelerated
inflation, and local supply and demand cpnditions. This adjusted basis can
then be used in localizing distant futures and ^n evaluating local elevator
i
contracts for later delivery. V^ile procedures' such as this lack complete
precision, they should provide workable basis projections for use "in evaluat-
ing forward pricing opportunities.— • «
Prices on Mid America-Commodity Exchange- ' ' '
This analysis, indicates^that .within a'pne-minute time interval, corn and,
soybean futures prices on the Mid America Commodity Exchange and the Chicago
Board of Trade have been nearly- identical. - Accordingly, the 1,000 bushel,
Mid America contracts offer farmers an alternative to the 5,000 bushel Board
of Trade contract. Ther. smaller contracts-may-'be especially useful in pricing
new-rcrbp soybeans by providing greater opportunity to spread out sales and to
match hedging volume, more closely witK expected production. ' In" some cases,
these same advantages also may be important in corn hedging.
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APPENDIX
1978
>fonth
and
Week
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
1979
Jan.
Feb.
March
April J
2
3
4
May
-94-
^pendix Table 1. Weekly Northwest Iowa Ck>m Basis, 1978-79
March
56
62
59
6X
58
57
55
54
53
47
43
43
44
42
40
41
37
41
42
40
41
38
44
45
Futures Contract Maturity Month
May July Sept
Basis (cents under futures)
62
68
66
68
64
64
62
61
61
55
51
51
52
50
48
49
46
49
51
50
52
49
51
50
54
52
55
54
53
54
5i
49
44
65
70
70
71
68
67
66
65
66
61
56
57
58
55
53
54
52
54
56
56
58
56
56
53
57
56
59
58
57
60
56
54
50
51
50
67
70
73
72
70
69
68
66
67
62
57
61
61
58
55
56
53
56
58
60
62
59
59
56
59
59
62
61
59
64
58
57
52
54
53
Dec
46
52
49
52
48
48
45
43
42
35
31
1979
Month
and
Week
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Appendix Table 1. Weekly Northwest Iowa Corn Basis 1978-79 (cont.)
Futures'Contract Maturity Month
March May July Sept. Dec.
s
Basis (cents under futures)
June 1 47 52
2 53 60
3 55 58
4 52 56
July 1 56 . 57
2 55 56
3 - 61 61
-
4
-
62 -
Aug'. 1 - 62
2 67
3 64
4 59
5 62
Sept. 1 50
•
2 60
3 76 83 88 89 • 63
4 80 87 92 94 67
Appendix Table 2. Weekly North Central Iowa Corn Basis, 1978-79
9
1978
*
1 Oct. -1 53 59 62 64 43
2 53 59 61 61 43
* 3 56 63 : 67 70 46
4 53 ' 60 63 64 44
i Nov. 1 46^ 52 56 58 36
2 47 54 57 59 38
3 41 48 52 54 31
4 41 48 52 53 30
5 39 • 47 52 53 28
Dec. 1 38 46 52 • 53 26
.2 39 47 52 53 27
3 40 48 54 58
4 39' 47 53 56
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Appendlx Table 2. Weekly North Central Iowa Corn Basis, 1978-79 (qont.)
1979,
Month
and
Week
Jan,
Feb
Mar.
April 1
2
3
U
May
June
July 1
2
3
Aug.
Sept.
March
34
29
30
33
36
39
40
39
38
42
38
68
70
Kutures Contract Maturity Month
May July Sept
Basis (cents under futures)
42
37
38
42
44-
48
50
50
49
49
44
49
44
43
45
43
36
38
41
39
75
77
47
42
43
48
49
53
56
56
56
54
47
52
48
47
49
47
42
43
45
44
43
42
43
46
47
50
52
49
49
80
82
50
44
45
49
51
55
60
60
59
57
50
54
51
50
52
49
46
45
48
46
46
45
48
53
50
54
53
50
49
48
54
54
54
50'
49
39
49
81
84
Dec
55
57
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Appendix Table 3. Weekly Northeast Iowa Corn Basis, 1978-79
g
1978
Month
and
Week Futures Contract Maturity Month
li
I .March l. May-. • r . -..tJulyV Sept. -• Dec.
r '
-
Basis (cents under futures) .
t' .. r .
Oct. 1 53 59 62 64 43
2 56 62 64 64 46
3 58 65 69 72 48
. k 52 . 59 62 63 43
Nov. 1 50 56 60 62 40'
2 45 52 55 57 36
3 - 44 51 55 57 34
4 38 45 49 50 27
, 5 39 • 47 52
1 \
53 28
Dec. 1 39 47 53 54 27
2 39 47 • 52 53 26
3 38 4.^ 52 56 •
k 37 • 45 • 51 54
3^979
1
Jan. 1 35 43 48 51
j
2 34 42 47 49
3 37 45 50 52
k 37 46 52 53
>
Feb. i 37 45 50 52
$ 2 39 48 53 " 55
A • 3 37 47 53 57
»
h 36 47 •53 57
• March 1 '35 46 53 ^ • 56
2 38 ^45 50 53
3 39 44 47 50
s k 41 44 46
5 40 44 47
s April I 41 45 48
2 41 45 48
3 39 43 45
h 33 39 43
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Appendix Table 3. Weekly Northeast Iowa Corn Basis, 1978-79 (cont.)
1979
Month
and
Week
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept. 1
2
3
4
March
66
65
Futures Contract Maturity Month
May July Sept.
Basis (c^nts under futures)
36
39
34
73
72
41
A3
39
38
38
43
45
51
52
46
51
50
78
77
43
46
41
41
41
48
52
54
56
47
52
50
56
56
49
^8
47
41
30
40
79
79
Dec.
53
52
• y
1978
Month
aiid
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Appendix Table 4. Weekly Southwest Iowa Corn Basis 1978-79
Week
• • Futures Contract Maturity ttonth
March July Sept. Dec
Basis (cents under futures)
Oct. 1 55 61 64 66 45
2 53 59 61 . 61 43
3 48 55 59 62 38
h 45 52 55 56 36
Nov. 1 47 53 57 59 37
2 45 •' 52 • 55 57 36
3 46 . 53 57 39 36
A 45 52 56 57 34
5 41 49 54 55. 30
Dec. 1 40 • 48 54 55 28
2 36 44 49 50 23
3 35 43 49 53
4 36 44 50 53
]979
.7nn. 1 32 40 45 48 • -
2 29 37 42 44
3 29-. .,'.•-.37 - . ^ • „42 44
A 31 40 46 47
Feb. 1 28 36 41 43
2 35 42 47 49
3 35 45 51 55
4 34 45 51 55
March 1
#
31 4 2 49 52
2 34 41 ' 45 49 •
3 34 . 39 42 45 ''
4.
J
38 41 ^ 43 '
5
' Is
38 42 45
April I 38 45 -
2 ' 41 48 .
3 '* 39
P ,
43 • 45
4 40 • 46 50 ' •
May J 41 46 48
2 40 44 47
3 35 40 • 42
4 40 • 43
5 40 ,
0
43
1979
Month
and
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Appendix Table A. Weekly Southwest Iowa Corn Basis 1978-79 (cont)
We(ik Futures Contrnct Maturity M<mLU
March May July Sept. Dec.
Basis (cents under futures)
June 1 40 45
2 41 48
3 44 4i7
4 47 51
July ] 43 kh
2 48 49
3 49 49
h 53
Aug. I 55
55z
3 53
U 51
5 55
Sept. 1 44
2 54
3 71 78 83 79
58
68 75 80 82 55
L978 Appendix Table 5. Weekly South1 Central Iowa. Com Basis, 1978-79
Oct. 1 54 60 63 fS 44
2 52 58 60 60 42
3 48 55 59 62 38
U 43 50 53 54 34
NcV « 1 47 53 57 59' 37
2 43 50 53 55 34
3 41 48 52 5i* 31
4 38 45 69 50 27
5 36 44 49 50 25
Dec. 1 36 44 50 51 24
2 34 42 47 48
22
3 36 44 50 54
4 35 43 49 52
1979
Jan. 1 34 42 47 50
2 29 37 42 44
3 29 37 42 44
4 27 36 42 43
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Appendix Table 5. Weekly.South Central Iowa Com Basis, 1978 79 (cont.)
1979
Month
and
Week
Feb. 1
2
•3
U
March I
2
3
4'
5
April 1
2
3
4
May,
June J
2
3
4
July
Aug.
Sept. 1
2
3
4
March
28
33
33
32
29
31
32
62
65
Futures Contract Maturity Month
May July • Sep t.
Basis (cents under futures)
36
A2
A3
A3
40
38
37
34
34
36
35
38
36
37
39
35
69
72
' 41 .
A7
49
49
47
43
40
37
38
40
39
42
42
42
43
41
39
38
40
44
44
45
42
45
44
74
77
43
49
53
53
50
46
43
39
41
43
42
44
46
•44
46
43
42
41
45
51
47
49
43
46
44
46
49
50
49
36
'47
3 5
45
75
79
Dec.
49
52
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Appendix Table 6. Weekly Southeast Iowa Corn Basis. 1978-79
1978
Montli
and
Week
Oct.
Nov
Dec.
1979
Jan.
Feb.
1
2
3
4
1
2
1
4
5
1
2
3
4
March \
2
3
4
5
April 1
2
3
4
May
March
44
48
47
42
43
36
34
Ik
28
31
30
30
28
30
27
26
25
25
26
27
28
27
30
28
Futures Contract Maturity MoAth
May July Sept.
Basis (cents under futures)
50
54
54
49
49
43
41
31
36
39
38
38
36
38
35
34
34
33
35
37
39
38
37
33
30
27
28
29
28
25
27
29
26
53
56
58
52
53
46
45
35
41
45
43
44
42
43
40
39
40
"38
40
43
45
45
42
36
33
31
32
33
32
31
32
33
31
30
29
55
56
61
53
55
48
47
36
42
46
kU
48
45
46
42
41
41
40
42
47
49
48
45
39
35
34
35
36
34
35
34
36
33
33
32
Dec.
34
38
37
33
33
27
24
13
17
19
18
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Appendix Table 6. Weekly Southeast Iowa Corn Basis, 1978-79 (cont.)
1979
Month
nnd
Weak
June 1
2
3
4
July
Aug.
Sept. 1
2
3
A
Futures _Cpntr«u:L Month
March
56
56
May July Sept.
Basis (cents under futures)
63
63
33
37
38
hU
38
A1
40
68
68
38
A4
41
48
39
42
40
40
46
38
43
28
35
22
32
69
70
Dae
43
43
Month
and
Week
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Appendix Table 7. Weekly Northwest Iowa Soybean Basis, 1978-79
Futures Contract Maturity Month
Jan. Mar. May July Aug. Sept. Nov.
1978: Basis (cents under futures)
Get. 1 67 74 77 78 70 53 60
2 65 72 73 74 66 42 60
3 72 81 86 85 79 60 63
4 72 82 85 87 75 5^ 64
Nov. 1 77 88 94 95 85 61 65
2 67 80 86 89 82 65 56
3 62 74 80 85 81 56 48
4 58 68 76 78 73 49
5 52 65 72 76 71 45
Dec. i 48 61 68 70 63 38
2 49 61 68 71 63 43
3 49 64 73 77 69 42
4 48 64 74 79 72 50
•
1979:
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
48
42
42
61 69 75 69 49
55 62 •67 60 40
56 65 71 66 40
58 68 76 71 44
59
65
67
67
67
63
63
72
80
82
83
83
79
71
70
68
66
59
57
58
51
44
42
81
88
91
91
95
88
79
77
77
75
72
71
71
68
62
59
55
52
77
76
83
80
91
86
73
70
69
67
67
67
72
70
66
64
59
57
49
37
37
31
5L
47
37
31
32
38
44
38
46
53
50
53
22
46
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Appendix Table 7. Weekly Northwest Iowa Soybean Basis, 1978-79 (cont.)
Mon t
ntid • ' _
Wi'ck l-'uiniv.s X!t)iuV.'wl -Milui-iLy Month
Jan. Mar. ' Hay - July A\ig. Sept.' Nov,
1979: Basis (cents under futures)
June 1 55 • " 61 58
2 64 72 76
3 66 ' 67 59
A 67 73 67
July 1 61 67 64
2. ' - 56 61 59
3 ^ 53 54 49
53 49
Aug. 1 41 39
2 53 53
3 48 50
k 50
3 51
Sept.• , 1- - 18
2 • 47
3 87 105 116 . 124 124 108
4 91 107 123 132 137 127
71
7A
Appendix Table 8. Weekly North Central Iowa Soybean Basis, 1978-79
1978
' GcL". 1 60 67 70 •71 63 45 53
2 59 66 67 68 60 37 54
3 62 71 76 75 69 • 50 53
4 60 70 73 " 75 63 ' 44 52
i
7 Nov. 1 64 75 81 82 72 48
52
2 60 73 • 79 82 75 58
49
3 52 64 '• 70 •- 75 71 46 39
4 51 61 69 • 71 66 42
1
5 42 • 55 62 66 61 35
1 Dec. 1 41 54 61 , 63 56 31
2 42 54 61 64 56 36
3 52 •67 76 80 72 45
4 49 65 75 80 73 51 '
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Appendix Table 8. Weekly North Central Iowa Soybean Basis, 1978-79
Month
and
Week Futures Contract Maturity Month
Jan. Mar. May July Augl Sept
1979:
Basis (cents under futures)
Jan. 1 39 52 60 66 60 40
2 37 51 58 63 56 36
3 40 52 61 67 62 36
4 54 64 72 67 40
Feb. 1 53 66 75 71 43
2 60 75 83 71 32
3 60 75 84 76 30
U 60 76 84 73 24
Mar. 1 60 76 88 84 44
2 62 78 87 85 46
3 55 68 76 70 34
A 63 70 63 24
5 63 72 64 27
Apr. 1 60 69 61 32
2 62 75 70 47
3 59 73 69 40
A 49 64 65 39
May 1 48 65 67 50
2 43 61 65 49
3 39 56 61 50
A 54 58 48
5 53 58 47
June 1 56 62 59
2 58 66 70
3 65 66 58
A 62 68 62
July 1 56 62 59
2 56 61 59
3 53 53 48
4 52 48
Aug. 1 49 47
2 50 50
3 48 . 50
4 49
45
Sept. 1 53
2 47
3 85 103 114 122 122 106
4 89 105 121 130 135 125
Nov.
69
72
t y
Month
nntl
Week
1978:
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
]979:
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr,
May
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Appendix Table 9. Weekly Northeast Iowa Soybean Basis, 1978-79
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
A
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
1
2
J
4
5
Contract Maturity ^tonl:h
Jane Mar. May July Aug. Sept.
&asls (ccnts under futures)
57 64 67 68 60 43
57 64 65 66 58 34
61 70 75 74 68 49
61 71 74 . 76 64 45
66 77 , 83 84 74 50
56 69 75 78 71 54
51 63 69 74 70 45
50 60 68 70 65 41
43 56 63 67 62 36
44 57 64 66 59 34
45 57 64 67 59 39
47 62 71 75 67 40
43 59- 69 74 67 45
40 53 61 67 61 41
37 50 57 62 55 35
40 52 61 67 62 36
60 ' 70 78 73 46
52 65 74 70 42
64 79 87 75 36
58 73 82 74 28
58 74 82 71 22
56 72 84 ' 80 40
52 68 77 75 36
50 64 72 66 30
53 60 53 1.4
55 64 56 19
53 62 54 25
50 63 58 35
49 63 59 30
48 63 64 38
40 57 59 42
40 58 62 46
34 50 55 44
46 50 40
45 50 39
Nov.
50
52
52
53
54
45
38
Month
and
Week
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Appendix Table 9. Weekly Northeast Iowa Soybean Basis, 1978-79 (cont.)
Futures Contract Maturity Month
Jan. Mar. Hay July Aug. Sept
1979 Basis (cents under futures)
June 1 51 57 54
2 60 68 72
3 55 56 48
4 66 72 66
July 1 44 50 47
2 37 41 39
3 3(J 36 31
4 44 40
Aug. 1 41 39
2 33 33
3 32 34
4 38
5 38
Sept. 1 45
2 42
3 89 107 118 126 126 iin
4 91 107 123 132 137 12;
Nov.
73
74
1978
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
Appendix Table 10. Weekly Sputhwest Iowa Soybean Basis, 1978-79
1 68 75 78 79 71 53 61
2 64 71 72 73 65 41 59 ' t
3 67 76 81 80 74 55 58
4 70 80 83 85 73 54 62
1 74 85 91 92 82 58 62
-
2 68 81 87 90 83 66
57
3 67 79 85 90 86 61 53
4 61 71 79 81 76 52
5 53 66 7-3 77 72 46
1 46 59 66 68 61 36
•
2 45 57 64 67 59 39
3 45 60 69 73 65 38
4 41 57 67 72 65 43
t ?
Appendix Table 10,
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Weekly Southwest Iowa Soybean Basis, 1978-79 (coat.)
Month
and
Week Futures Contract Maturity t^nth
Jan. Mar. May July Aug. Sept
basis (cc»nts under futures)
1979:
Jan. 1 44 57 65 71 65 45
2 41 54 61 66 59 39
3 40 54 63 69 64 38
.4 62 72 . 80 75 48
Feb. 1 56 69 78 74 46
2 65 80 88 76 37
3 65 80 89 81 35
4 66 82 90 79 30
Mar. I 63 79 91 87 47
2 55 71 80 78 39
3 51 65 73 67 31
4 62 69 62 23
5 59 68 60 23
Apr. 1 58 67 59 30
2 57 70 65 42
3 57 71 67 38
4 54 69 70 44
May 1 48 65 67 50
2 41 59 63 47
3 33 49 54 43
A 51 55 45
5 50 55 44
June 1 53 59 56
2 57 65 69
3 64 65 57
4 72 78 72
July 1 49 55 52
2 50 55 53
3 36 36 31
4 41 37
Aug. 1 32 30
2 29 29
3 I, 33 35
4 38
5 v»'' 46
Sept. 1 47
2 34
3 89 107 118 126 126 110
4 89 105 121 130 135 125
Nov
73
72
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Appendix Table 11. Weekly South Central Iowa Soybean Basis, 1978-79
Month
and
Week Futures Contract Maturity Month
Jan. Mar May July Aug. Sept.
1978: Basis (ccnt.s under futures)
Oct. 1 59 66 69 70 62 44
2 55 62 63 64 56 •J3
3 60 69 74 73 67 48
it 61 71 74 76 64 45
Nov. I 65 76 82 83 73 49
2 59 72 78 81 74 57
3 52 64 70 75 71 46
4 47 57 65 67 62 38
5 44 57 64 68 63 37
Dec. 1 38 51 58 60 53 28
2 41 53 60 63 55 35
3 43 58 67 71 63 36
4 41 57 67 72 65 4 3
1979 :
Jan. i 35 48 56 62 56 36
2 32 46 53 58 51 31
3 35 47 56 62 57 31
4 54 64 72 67 40
Feb. 1 50 63 72 68 40
2 58 73 81 69 30
3 58 73 82 74 28
4 55 71 79 68 19
Mar. 1 55 71 83 79 39
2 48 64 73 71 32
3 44 57 65 59 23
4 51 58 51 12
5 51 60 52 15
Apr. I 48 57 49 20
2 48 61 56 33
3 48 ' 62 58 29
4 44 59 60 34
May 1 42 59 61 44
2 38 55 59 43
3 34 51 56 45
4 46 50 40
5 45 50 39
Nov.
52
50
51
53
53
48
39
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Appendix Table 11. "Weekly' South Central Iowa Soybean Basis 1978-79 (cont.)
Montli " . . 5 . - '
and • '• J'" 'y-.',.
Week • - Futures Contract ^laturlty Month
Jan. Mar. ' - May July Aijr. . Sept. Nov,
• Kasis (ccnts under futures) .
June 1 . •
' 2
... 3 -r'
^ ^ . '5.:
July 1' - V , .' tv
2 . v.
3 • •>• •Hr..',-
48 • •- ' 54 51
61 . 69 73
53 - 54 46
63 69 •; 63
48 54 51
39 1.", 43 : 41
35
V 35 ' 30
36 32
, i ' 37 35
33 ' • 33
30 32
• 34
33
+37
'
27
112 ."j,.•> _v' . 112 96
121 126 116
Aug. 1
2' : • vt,.
3' • .
A
5- • ' = .
Sept. 1
2
3 • 75 \93 'v - lOA : - 96 - 59
4 80 ' 96 lli2 . ->;•;' 63
Appendix Table'12. Weekly South-^ast Iqw4^Soybean Basis, 1978-79
1978
',v
f
Get. 1 47
*i/-V
54 " ,57 58 50 32 40'
2 44 51 52 . -53 . 45 22 39
3 49 58.- • 63 62 56 ^ 37 40
4 50 . 60 63 65 53 34 42
Nov. 1 53 64 ' 70
> i
71 61 ' 37 41
2 46 59 f . ".65 .
'
68 51 44 35
3 42 - 54,.^ .;>^o ' i 65 61 36- 29
4 34 , 44 -,| " 52 1 . 54 49 25 . •
5 32, : 45VV • 52 56 .51 25
Dec. i. 28 4li:^ J48. ' 50 43 ; 18
2 31 . ' 43:;:. ' 50 53 45 ' 25
. -3 37 • 52a^ , 61-
t
, 65 57 - 30
4 30 r . 46 56 61 54 32
..i- ^ .... - ,
I
' r I • .
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Appendix Table 12, Weekly Southeast Iowa Soybean Basis, 1978-79 (cont.)
Month
and
Week
1979 :
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
June
July
Aug.
I'uLurcs Contr.'u:L MnLur.lty Monti)
Jan. Mar. May . July Aug. ' Stpt. Nov.
Basis (events under futures)
1 31 52 58 52 ri
2 28 42 49 54 47 27
3 29 41 . 50 56 51 25
45 55 63 58 31
1 42 55 64 60 32
2 51 66 ' 74 62 23
3 50 65 74 66 20
4 51 67 75 164 15
1 47 63 75 71 31
2 43 59 68 66 27
3 35 50 58 52 16
A 45 52 45 06
5 43 52 44 07
] 42 51 43 14
2 4L 54 49 26
3
•
39 53 49 20
h 37 52 53 27
1 30 47 49 32
2 30 47 51 35
3 25 41 46 35
U 37 41 31
5 36 41 30
1 40 46 43
2 48 56 60
3 43 44 36
4 53 59 53
1 35 41 38
O 34 39 37
3 28 28 23
A 29 25
1 28 26
2 26 26
.3 23 25
L
5 27
1 +3J
2 23
3 61 79 90 98 103 87
4 69 85 101 110 115 105
45
52
'•>
'
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